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ABSTRACT

Reconstruction, as viewed by historians, is usually
divided into two distinct periods,

"Presidential" and

"Congressional," each controlled by a different branch of the
United States Government.
This approach leaves one major question unanswered:
What of Grant,

"the tanner boy," and Reconstruction?

After

all, President Ulysses S. Grant was elected to the office of
President of the United States in 1868, and served in that
capacity from March 4, 1869, until March 4, 1877, when
Rutherford B. Hayes assumed office.
Grant:

"The Tanner Bov" and Reconstruction answers this

question and determines why Grant has been deemed less
important than Lincoln, Johnson, or Congress during this
period.

This thesis examines Grant's plans for

reconstructing the Union, his success in implementing them,
and his overall impact on Reconstruction.

In evaluating

these issues, primary attention has been placed upon G r a n t ’s
presidential presentations, especially his State of the Union
addresses and proclamations.
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"Grant's postwar career was decidedly anticlimactic.
To be
sure he was elected as a Republican to two terms as president
(1869-1877), but his administrations were marred by
indecisive leadership, an inconsistent policy on southern
Reconstruction, and massive corruption."
William L. Barneyi

"But the class next after us [1843] was destined to furnish
the man who was to eclipse us all— to rise to the rank of
general, an office made by Congress to honor his services,
who became President of the United States, and for a second
term; who received the salutations of all the powers of the
world in his travels as a private citizen around the earth,
of noble, generous heart, a lovable character, a valued
friend,— Ulysses S. Grant."
James B. Longstreetz

1 William L. Barney, "Grant, Ulysses S.," Eric Foner and
John A. Garraty, eds., The Reader's Companion To American
History (Boston, 1991), 465-66.
2 James Longstreet, From Manassas To Appomatox (1895;
Reprint, New York, 1994), 4.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

At approximately 4:15 a.m., April 12, 1861, the national
ties between the northern and southern states of the United
States of America were broken.

As Mary Chestnut,

of Charleston, South Carolina noted in her diary,

a citizen
"If [Major

Robert] Anderson does not accept terms - at four - the orders
are he shall be fired upon" and then "at half-past four, the
heavy booming of cannon."i

Thus, the Confederate forces

initiated the American Civil War by opening fire on the
Federal garrison at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, South
Carolina and the American governmental system based on the
Constitution of the United States of America failed to avert
a costly civil war.
After two years and eight months of savage conflict,
with demoralizing defeats at such places as Bull Run and
Chancellorsville,

frustrating draws at Shiloh and Antietam,

and spectacular victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the
Union forces seemed to be on the road to eventual victory.
As a result, President Abraham Lincoln took the first steps
toward bringing about the reconstruction of the nation.

On

December 8, 1863, the President in a formal proclamation to

1 C . Vann Woodward, e d ., Mary Chestnut's Civil War (New
Haven, 1981), 46.

1

the nation outlined the steps to be followed by any
southerner who wished to reestablish his allegiance to the
United States.

Lincoln's program also provided the

guidelines for the collective citizenry of any southern state
desiring to return their state to the U n i o n . 2

His plan, which was met with extensive discussion both
north and south of the Mason-Dixon line, initiated the first
phase of Reconstruction known collectively by American
historians as the period of "Presidential Reconstruction."
The issues which Lincoln, Congress and his three predecessors
faced were extremely complex and seemed to defy resolution.
They included such diverse problems as finding a just peace
out of civil war, national unity out of sectional strife,
equal civil rights out of slavery, equality of race out of
discrimination, and free suffrage out of intimidation.

From

December 8, 1863, until his assassination on April 15, 1865,
Lincoln attempted to both chart and implement the process of
rebuilding the United States into a single free nation.
With Lincoln's death, Vice-President Andrew Johnson
assumed that responsibility, and quickly set out to establish
his own set of Reconstruction policies.

His efforts met

determined resistance in Congress, which sought to implement
its own plans.

This collision of ideas resulted in a period

of bitter disagreements and recriminations which lasted until
1867, when Congress defeated President Johnson's plans,
p r o g r a m s , and ambitions.
2 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols.,
Washington, DC, 1896-1899), VI, 213.

In March 1867 Congress passed, over President Johnson's
veto, The Reconstruction Acts of 1867, which sub-divided the
southern states into five distinct military districts, each
under the command of a single military officer.

Under these

acts the new military governor was to utilize the military
forces at his disposal to protect the citizenry and property
located within the district.

This legislation also provided

yet a third plan for rebuilding and readmitting the South
into the Union.

This new procedure signaled the beginning of

Congressional Reconstruction, which ran its course from March
of 1867 to the final days of 1877, when with the collapse of
the few remaining Republican State governments in the South,
the process ended.
Reconstruction then, as viewed by historians,

is usually

divided into two distinct periods controlled by two different
branches of the United States government.

The first period,

defined as "Presidential Reconstruction," was controlled by
Presidents Lincoln and Johnson from 1863 to approximately
March 1867.

The second period is identified as the time of

"Congressional Reconstruction" from March 1867 to December
1877.
This approach to the period leaves one major
question unanswered:
Reconstruction?3

What of Grant,

"the tanner boy," and

After all, President Ulysses S. Grant was

elected to the office of President of the United States in
1868, and served in that capacity from March 4, 1869, until
March 4, 1877, when Rutherford B. Hayes assumed office.
3 New York Tribune, May 16, 1864, p. 2.

Grant held the presidency for eight years, and all of them
fell within the nation's Reconstruction period.
therefore,

Grant,

should have been, at least in part, responsible

for the course of the United S t a t e s 's Reconstruction after
the Civil War for more than twice as long as either Lincoln
or Johnson.

Yet, his period of office remains obscured under

the label of "Congressional Reconstruction."
Grant is in part to blame for this unusual circumstance.
When Grant wrote his autobiography, he neglected, perhaps due
to the advanced stage of his own terminal illness, to discuss
his presidency in any detail.

Rather, for all practical

purposes, he ended his work with the closing of the war.
Indeed, Grant only hints at those things which occurred
between 1865 and 1877 in the last seven pages of his book.
Historian William S. McFeely in the "new introduction" to
G r a n t ’s work, published in 1982, even went so far as to state
that "it is not impossible that these final pages also show
how huge doses of morphine had begun to take their toll on
the dying writer."4

Nevertheless, those few pages are all the

information Grant imparted to his readers on his service as
President of the United States.
This absence of discussion by the man himself has led
others to conclude that perhaps nothing really significant
happened to Grant after he ended his command of the Union
forces.

Evidence to support this determination can be found

in E. B. Long's introduction to the 1952 publication of
4 william S. McFeely, "New Introduction," E. B. Long,
ed., Personal Memoirs Of U. S. Grant (New York, 1952;
reprint, 1982), [5].

Grant's autobiography.

In it, Long asserts that although the

former General was also the President of the United States,
"Grant the soldier was the real man;" and that "the rest was
anticlimax."5

Long goes on to argue that the American people

have been "willing to overlook the sometimes unfortunate
years of the presidency" precisely because Grant "as a
soldier" had "won the hearts of America."5
Others historians, such as George C. Rable, in But There
Was No P e a c e . Eric Foner, in Reconstruction;
Unfinished Revolution.

A m e r i c a 's

1863-1877. and Brooks D. Simpson in

Let Us Have Peace;

Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War

and Reconstruction.

1861-1868. have all sought to examine

Grant's activities, within the context of the reconstructive
process.

But in each case the attention directly related to

Grant's presidential years has been limited.
Rable, for instance, concentrated on examining the role
of southern violence during Reconstruction.

Within that

context, he determined that "President Ulysses S. Grant tried
to administer the laws passed by Congress without actively
participating in the legislative process," but Rable did not
explain why Grant followed that course.?

The author also

discovered that "the inconsistency of Federal reconstruction
policy" under Grant combined with the sheer "strength of
southern resistance seemed to have doomed the reconstruction

5 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. G r a n t , xx.

5 Ibid., xxiii.
? George C. Rable, But There Was No Peace;
The Role of
Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction (Athens, Ga.,
1984), 191.

experiment to inevitable collapse."8

R a b l e 's analysis did not

center on Grant specifically, but rather approached the topic
of Reconstruction from a different perspective.

This

approach, although well developed, failed to establish a
complete evaluation of President Grant's activities during
this period.
Eric Foner, in his excellent work, addressed the entire
spectrum of Reconstruction,

from the political activities of

the individual Presidents and Congress to the economic and
social changes which reshaped the nation.

In accomplishing

this, the author out of necessity reduced Grant to one of a
great many historical figures that participated in the
process.

Therefore, Grant's role is deemphasized to fit into

the greater patterns of Reconstruction, and Foner's
references to him often take the form of general comments
relating to his administration.

For example, in evaluating

Grant's second term, Foner finds that because it was
"buffeted by the shifting tides of public opinion,
preoccupied first with the economic depression and later with
yet another wave of political scandals," that the government
"found it impossible to devise a coherent policy toward the
South."8

This statement, in and of itself, establishes only

that Grant's administration in general did not find the
correct solutions, in Foner's opinion, to the problems of
Reconstruction.

Comments like these, however, do not clearly

8 Ibid., xii.
8 Eric Foner, Reconstruction;
America's Unfinished
Revolution. 1863-1877 (New York, 1988), 528.

establish if Grant was personally to blame for this failure.
His role, therefore, remains hidden under the cloak of
"Congressional Reconstruction."
In Let Us Have P e a c e . Brooks D. Simpson elected to adopt
yet another approach to studying Grant's legacy, by
evaluating his performance between 1861 and 1868.

This

author worked to demonstrate that Grant as a participant in
Reconstruction was a better man at his job, both militarily
and politically, than others had previously recognized.
Unfortunately, Simpson chose to end his narrative at
precisely the same point that others had ended theirs, the
time at which General Grant became President Grant.

This

stopping place would certainly have been acceptable, were it
not for the fact that in his conclusion Simpson elected to
join the ranks of other historians by criticizing G r a n t 's
accomplishments during the next eight years not examined by
his book.

In his summary, he declared that "although Grant

continued to hold fast to his ultimate objectives of reunion
and racial justice," during his presidency, he was forced
however grudgingly to unofficially acknowledge "that the
price of sectional reconciliation was justice toward the
freed-people."

Simpson concluded that Grant was eventually

compelled to give up "the vision of peace glimpsed at
Appamatox Court House" and surrender the Freedmen to the
control of the southern redeemers . 10

Simpson neither supports

these concluding remarks with additional arguments nor states
Brooks D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace;
Ulysses S.
Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction. 1861-1868
(Chapel Hill, 1991), 254.
10

whether or not Grant was personally responsible for this
tragic failure.

Again as before, Grant's presidency is

criticized without an adequate supporting explanation.
Unlike the other scholars, William S. McFeely, Grant's
principal biographer, did explain in some detail his
presidential years in the book G r a n t ;

A Biography.

But in

writing the material, the author by choice tended to
concentrate more on Grant the man than on the man as
President.

This often resulted in the reader being left with

the impression of a mediocre individual who at a time of
great crisis rose to prominence and then fell upon hard times
as the Chief Executive of the United States.

Indeed, McFeely

implied that Grant found his life's work almost by accident—
that after reaching the age of "nearly forty no job he liked"
came "his way - and so he became general and president
because he could find nothing better to do."11

This same

basic tone dominates the book, and McFeely specifically
declares that in the final analysis Grant " . . .

did not rise

above limited talents or inspire others to do so in ways that
make his administration a credit to American politics."1^
Statements like these severely downgrade Grant's presidency
and clearly lead one to the conclusion that Grant's actions
in Reconstruction must have been ineffective.
These types of comments, by historians such as McFeely,
have consistently served to reduce President Grant's

11 William S. McFeely, G r a n t ;
1982), xii.
12 Ibid.,

522.

A Biography

(New York,

importance and to conceal his efforts under the label of
Congressional Reconstruction.

Yet, they are incomplete and

fail to explain why Grant acted as he did during his
administration.

The purpose of this paper, therefore, will

be to determine why Ulysses S. Grant has been deemed less
important than Lincoln, Johnson, or Congress during
Reconstruction.

It will seek to answer the following

questions:
1.

What were Grant's plans for reconstructing the
Union?

2.

Was he successful in implementing any of his plans?

3.

Did his plans and actions impact the Reconstruction
process?

In attempting to answer these questions, primary attention
will be placed upon Grant's presidential speeches, especially
his State of the Union addresses and proclamations.

In these

official presentations to the collective nation the President
outlined his perception of the problems and solutions for
dealing with the complex issues of Reconstruction.

Grant's

key objectives will then be compared to the actual historical
events of the period to determine his successes, failures and
influence.

CHAPTER 2

GRANT'S BACKGROUND
On March 4, 1869, Ulysses S. Grant was inaugurated as
the eighteenth President of the United States.

Initially,

Grant, as the most famous Union general to emerge from the
Civil War, offered much hope to the Nation.

The Republican

party had nominated him unanimously in May 1868.

He had

promised to provide the conflict-weary nation the very thing
it desired most— "Peace."i

Supporters, such as Frederick

Douglass, a black American and former abolitionist, clearly
expected great accomplishments from Grant's presidency.

As

Douglass stated in August 1869, several months after Grant
had assumed office,

"I say then, if General Grant goes

forward, determines to fight it out on this line, we have
nothing to fear . . . and the principle of equal rights will
become everywhere practical and permanent."2

Many an American

believed that Grant would bring the long awaited peace to the
nation and help resolve the vexing difficulties of
Reconstruction.

1 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols.,
Washington, DC , 1896-1899), VII, 5.
2 John W. Blassingame and John R. McKivigan, eds., The
Frederick Douglass Papers (Series One, 5 vols., N e w Haven,
1991), Series One, IV, 236.
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The new president was a complex personality who
continues to puzzle historians.
faces and attitudes.

He was a man of diverse

A simple loving family man who hated

being away from his family for long periods, he chose
careers, the army and politics, which demanded that he spend
considerable amounts of time away from them.

He was a man of

war, serving in both the Mexican War and the American Civil
War, and as the leading Union military officer in the latter
conflict was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands,
if not hundreds of thousands of men.

Yet, Grant was also a

man of peace, who could not stand the sight of blood and for
much of his later life advocated peaceful coexistence between
the North and South, as well as between white and black
Americans.

While both he and his wife Julia Dent Grant,

prior to the war, owned between them a total of five slaves,
Grant played an essential role in freeing all slaves and then
became their protector during Reconstruction.

Grant

consistently demonstrated an absolute inability to manage his
own business affairs, and yet he achieved the positions of
Commanding General of the United States Army in the American
Civil War and the office of the President of the United
States of America for two terms.

Therefore, to understand

the man, which in turn enables one to comprehend his
subsequent impact on Reconstruction, it is necessary to
examine the life of the leader known to the nation as Ulysses
S. or simply "Sam" Grant.
Hiram Ulysses Grant, which was his true given name, was
born on April 27, 1822, at Pleasant, Ohio.

Typical of the

12
many contradictions in Grant's life were the various name
changes that he experienced.

Based on a meeting of the minds

of family members, Hiram was selected as his first name.

As

a boy, Grant went by the nickname "Lyss," which was
eventually changed to "Sam" at West Point."3

The name that

Grant is generally known by, Ulysses S. Grant, resulted from
a bureaucratic mistake, compounded by inflexible authorities.
As the story goes, when Grant was appointed to West Point by
Representative Thomas L. Hamer, the congressman forgot the
applicant's true name.

So, rather than ask, he simply wrote

in the name Grant generally went by, Ulysses, and then
entered the first letter of his mother's maiden name "S" for
Simpson.

When Grant reported to West Point, he found that he

could not register as H. Ulysses Grant, the name he selected
in order to avoid being known as "Hug"
of his initials.

a name formed by use

Instead, he had to sign in as Ulysses S.

Grant, as there was an appointment only for an individual by
that name.4

As a result, Hiram Ulysses Grant became Ulysses

S. Grant, and the change would help him, when during the
Civil War, he became known as U. S. Grant or Unconditional
Surrender Grant.

These name changes were typical examples of

Grant's willingness outside of the military, to allow others
to direct events in his life, rather than insisting on having
his own way.

York,

3 E . B . L o n g , e d ., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (New
1982), 6-7.

4 Ibid.
For additional information regarding Grant's
early life see, William S. McFeely, G rant; A Biography (New
York, 1982), 1-67.
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Grant's life fell into four parts.

They were as a

soldier and participant in the Mexican War, a civilian and
business failure, a Civil War officer and war hero, and a
politician and President of the United States.

Each period

had its special impact on his life, and each contributed to
Grant's handling of the complexities of Reconstruction.
Grant spent his childhood uneventfully attending school
and helping his father, Jesse Root Grant, in his leather
tanning business, making Grant a "tanner boy."

But at age

seventeen, his father announced to him that he was "going to
receive" an appointment to West Point.

He initially

declined, but Jesse insisted and Grant eventually conceded.
Grant had resisted only because he "had a very exalted idea
of the acquirement necessary to get through" West Point and
he "did not believe . . .[that he] possessed them, and could
not bear the idea of failing. "5

Contrary to his apprehensions

Grant graduated twenty-first out of a class of thirty-nine
cadets.e

Upon completing this formal military education he

was assigned to the Fourth United States Infantry at
Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis, Missouri.
During this time Grant recognized one of his principal
personality traits.

While traveling to a duty assignment, he

encountered a swollen river overflowing its banks.

Instead

of taking an alternate route or seeking a better crossing,
which would have delayed his travel, Grant plunged his horse
into the river and at great risk to himself and the horse
s Long, e d . , Personal Memoirs of U. S. G r a n t . 11.
e Ibid.,

16.

forced his way across.

Grant

stated that one of his

"superstitions had always been when
any where

. . . [he] started to go

. . . not to turn back, or stop until the thing

intended was accomplished."7

Throughout his life, he refused

to deviate from a course of travel, or as later events would
show, a course of action, that he had chosen.

This belief

was expanded subsequently to include his political decisions
and loyalty to his friends as

well.

This characteristic

helps explain why Grant often

seemed determined to batter

his

way through the enemy lines, such as at Vicksburg and the
Wilderness, when another might have considered an alternate
course of action.

Similarly, this trait serves to clarify

Grant's relationships to both the South and Congress during
Reconstruction.
Although his graduation from West Point required him to
serve in the military, it was never his "intention to remain
in the army long, but to prepare . . . [himself] for a
professorship in some college."8

But, the United States

annexation of Texas and the coming of the Mexican War
intervened; the country was deprived of a college instructor,
but gained an officer.

He found himself drawn into a war

that he actually detested rather than supported.

"Bitterly

opposed to the [annexation of Texas]," he regarded "the war
which resulted as one of the most unjust ever waged by a
stronger against a weaker nation."9

7 Ibid., 20-21.
8 Ibid., 21.
9 Ibid., 22.

Duty to country over came

15
conscience, and Grant served with distinction.

As a result

of his actions in the field, he received promotions, to a
"full" Second Lieutenant, then to First Lieutenant and
finally to the rank of "Brevet Captain."

In accomplishing

this, Grant demonstrated his courage and ability to himself
and to his peers. 10
After the war, Grant remained in the army until poor
pay, separation from his family, and boredom led to his
resignation on April 11, 1854.

This action initiated the

second phase of his life— that of a former Army officer
turned civilian.
happy one.

In this capacity Grant's life was not a

Between the years of 1854 and 1861, one business

failure after another haunted him.

He tried his hand at

farming and built his own home, which according to his wife
Julia Dent Grant "looked so unattractive that [they]
facetiously decided to call it Hardscrabble."11

When working

his own farm did not prove profitable, Grant leased it and
worked the farm land of his father-in-law, Frederick Fayette
Dent.
During these years, Grant owned slaves.

In order to

make a living for himself and his family on his father-inlaw's farm, he used the labor of perhaps as many as twelve
slaves.

Out of these, Grant only owned one outright, a slave

by the name of William Jones; the others belonged to Julia's

10 For additional information on G r a n t 's Mexican War
service see, Lloyd Lewis, Captain Sam Grant (Boston, 1950),
131-263.
11 John Y. Simon, ed., The Personal Memoirs of Julia Dent
Grant TMrs Ulysses S. Grant1 (Carbondale, 1975), 79.

16
father.

As the volume of work required it, Grant also

periodically hired the labor of one or two slaves from
neighbors to augment his labor force.

Grant like many other

Southern slave holders worked alongside these blacks in the
field and shared the hardships of farm labor.
are that Grant treated these men humanely.

Indications

His wife, Julia,

also owned a total of four slaves who worked directly with
her on the farm. 12
In spite of G r a n t 's best efforts and the labor of these
slaves, illness and bad luck took its toll and "in the fall
of 1858

. . . [Grant] sold . . . [his] stock, crops, and

farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming."13

Grant,

however, did not sell William, his only slave, to a new
owner.

Instead,

ignoring the financial loss his action

entailed, Grant freed William.

Julia, in contrast, elected

to keep her slaves until their eventual move to Galena,
Illinois, a "free state" caused her to lease them to others.
Later, during the war, Julia resumed control of her slave,
also named Julia, and brought her on visits to the General's
headquarters.14

Although within less than thirty years Grant,

in his biography, expressed wonder at the South for having
"fought for or justified institutions which acknowledged the
right of property in man," it must be recognized that he and

12 McFeely,
13

Grant. 58-63.

Long, ed. Personal Memoirs of U. S. G r a n t .106.

14 McFeely, Grant, 62-3.

his wife had at one time held their fellow beings as
p roperty.is
Grant then moved on to real estate forming a partnership
with his wife's cousin, Harry Bogg.

Grant believed that the

"business might have become prosperous if . . . [he] had been
able to wait for it to grow, is
so.

But he was not willing to do

His wife found other reasons for this business failure.

According to Julia she could never "imagine how . . . [her]
dear husband ever thought of going into such a business, as
he could never collect a penny that was owed to him" if the
debtor "only expressed" regrets at not being able to pay the
money back.

She found that he "always felt sorry for them

and never pressed" the issue.17

He also tried his hand at

running for the office of county engineer in St. Louis,
Missouri, but was defeated.

In May 1860, Grant rejected both

the real estate business and local politics and suffered the
indignity of moving to Galena, Illinois, where he accepted a
position as clerk in his father's tanning business.

Grant's

attempts at private enterprise had failed miserably, and he
found it very difficult to meet the needs of his family.is
The American Civil War rescued Ulysses S. Grant from
obscurity and possibly from poverty.

Following the call for

volunteers, Grant went back to the life of a soldier.

During

15 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. G r a n t . 85.
is ibid., 117.
17 Simon, ed., Julia Dent G r a n t . 80.
is For additional information regarding Grant's business
years see, McFeely, Grant, 41-66 and Lewis, Captain Sam
Grant, 333-93.

this third stage in his life, Grant established himself as
one of the premier Union generals.

His activities at the

battles of Belmont, Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, solidified
G r a n t ’s reputation as a hard fighting officer.

Indeed,

Grant's "ungenerous and unchivalrous" demand for "an
unconditional and immediate surrender" of Confederate
Brigadier General Simon B. Buckner at Fort Donelson in
February 1862 brought Grant fame as "Unconditional Surrender"
Grant.19

Although later, taken by surprise during the battle

of Shiloh, Tennessee, on April 6, 1862, Grant impressed
President Lincoln and demonstrated that under his command the
Union Army would fight and inflict damage on the Confederate
forces.20
While describing Shiloh in his autobiography, Grant
introspectively noted the two sides of his own personality—
the grim warrior determined to stem the tide of retreat and
the gentle man repulsed by the sights and sounds of war.

In

the evening following the decisive stand of the Union forces,
in which thousands lost their lives, Grant sought refuge from
the rain that pelted the survivors.

"The log-house under the

bank" in which he took shelter "had been taken as a hospital,
and all night wounded men were brought in, their wounds
dressed, a leg or arm amputated as the case might require."
Grant found this "sight . . . more unendurable than
encountering the enemy's fire, and . . . [he] returned to
19

Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. G r a n t . 159.

20 For additional information regarding the battle of
Shiloh see, Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April (New York,
1974).
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. . . [his] tree in the r a i n . "21

Grant, the resolute general

of the Union forces, was also a gentle man who could not
stand the sights and sounds of the wounded.

Grant fully

understood the negative side of warfare and the pain that it
created.

This knowledge had a significant impact on his

approach to Reconstruction and helped make peace and the
avoidance of conflict the primary goal of his presidency.
Although Grant experienced personal disappointment and
accusations of drunkenness following Shiloh, he subsequently
oversaw a chain of northern victories.

On April 30, 1863,

for instance, having survived the initial frustrations and
failures of a rigorous campaign, the General's command
crossed the Mississippi River below the Confederate positions
at Vicksburg.

Cutting lose from his base of supplies, Grant

in a series of daring attacks defeated the divided
Confederate commanders and forced Lieutenant General John C.
Pemberton to retreat into Vicksburg.

After a lengthy but

successful siege, the "Rock of Gibraltar" of the Southern
Confederacy, was surrendered to Grant's forces on July 4,
1863, cutting the rebellious states in two.

This victory, in

conjunction with that of General Gordon Meade at Gettysburg,
turned the course of the war against the C o n f e d e r a c y .22

From Vicksburg, Grant assumed overall command of the
Union forces in the West and directed the operations
21

Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. G r a n t . 181.

22 For additional information regarding the battle of
Vicksburg see, William T. Sherman, The Memoirs of William T.
Sherman (2 vols, 1875; Reprint.
New York, 1994), I, 226-51
and James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom:
The Civil War
Era (New York, 1988), 405-14.
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resulting in the total rout of Confederate General Braxton
Bragg's forces at Chattanooga, Tennessee.

Next, Grant,

freshly promoted to the grade of Lieutenant General of the
Army by a special act of Congress, assumed the overall
command of the Union Armies.

Working in conjunction with

President Lincoln, and Generals William Tecumseh Sherman and
Philip Henry Sheridan, Grant developed and implemented plans
for the final defeat of the South.

Although the road to

Appomattox Court House was a long and bloody one passing
through places like the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna
Crossing, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg, Grant's army helped
batter the Confederacy into submission.

Grant "the butcher"

finally, on April 9, 1865, forced General Robert E. Lee and
his Army of Northern Virginia to s u r r e n d e r . 23
Although this harsher side that made Grant such a
determined warrior is obvious, his softer side has often been
overlooked.

Even though Grant had shown little mercy in

battle, in victory he revealed both mercy and forgiveness.
His liberal surrender terms at Vicksburg and Appomattox Court
House furnished clear examples of this tendency.

On July 3,

1863, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, the commander of
the Confederate forces at Vicksburg, proposed an armistice,
to explore terms for the city's surrender.

This provided

Grant an opportunity offered few Civil War generals, the
total destruction of an Army in the field by its surrender.
23 For additional information regarding the course of the
Civil War in 1863-1865 see, Bruce Catton, Grant Moves South
(Boston, 1960), Catton, Grant Takes Command (Boston, 1968),
and Noah Andre Trudeau, Bloody Roads South;
The Wilderness
to Cold Harbor. Mav-June 1864 (Boston, 1989).
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Grant quickly advised Pemberton that "the useless effusion of
blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any
time you choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city
and garrison."24

Although at first harsh, these terms were

softened considerably by subsequent discussions between
Pemberton and Grant, which took place between the lines on
July 3, 1864, and by a subsequent exchange of correspondence.
Grant allowed the Confederates to sign a parole agreeing not
to take up arms against the Union until properly exchanged.
This meant that the Confederate soldier could not with honor
return to active duty until they were traded for a Union
prisoner of war of equal rank, a Confederate private for a
Union private for instance.

In the interim, instead of being

shipped off to a prison camp to await a prisoner exchange, as
was the standard practice, they were allowed to go home.

In

addition Grant agreed that "officers . . . [would] be allowed
their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one
horse each. "25

The army, which had denied the North the city

of Vicksburg and killed thousands of its men, was allowed to
quit the war and return to their families in the hope that
they would never return to the front.

Grant advised his

superiors that it was "a great advantage to" the Union to be
free of the burdensome prisoners.

He declared that their

parole would save time, and free up both his troops and their
transport ships for prompt reassignment . 26

Nonetheless, Grant

24 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. G r a n t . 290-91.
25 ibid., 292-96.
26 ibid., 297.
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had in truth shown his former enemies mercy by granting them
an opportunity to escape the confines of unhealthy northern
prison camps.

Thus, Grant as early as 1863, had adopted a

basic mind set that advocated that when the fighting stopped,
the former Confederates should be allowed to go home without
recriminations or punishment.
The liberal surrender terms granted to the Army of
Virginia in 1865 revealed the same approach.

To understand

how liberal these terms were, it is necessary to reflect on
the horribly bloody battles during the final year of the war.
In May,

1864, the Army of the Potomac under Grant's command

had moved across the Rapidan River to confront the Army of
Northern Virginia.

Over the next twelve months these two

armies were locked in almost constant struggle until the
surrender at Appomattox on April 9, 1865.

During that period

of combat, the Army of the Potomac suffered in excess of
eighty thousand casualties.

It would have been easy for

General Grant, after being forced to expend the his troops in
exhausting combat, to have sought revenge against his enemy.
Instead, he sought to end the bloodshed quickly and to bring
peace to the nation.27
On April 9, 1864, when Grant received an inquiry from
General Lee as to possible terms, he responded that he was
"equally anxious for peace."

Grant advised Lee that "the

terms upon which peace" could be obtained were "well

27 For information regarding the fighting during 1864
see, General Horace Porter, Campaigning With Grant (New York,
1897), 35-466 and Bruce Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox
(Garden City, 1953).
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understood" and that "by the South laying down their arms" it
would "hasten the most desirable event, save thousands of
lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet
destroyed . "28

Grant's plan for peace was a simple one.

If

the Confederates surrendered their weapons and stopped
fighting, the war would end.
In effect, those were the conditions that Lee and Grant
finally settled upon.

Lee's army agreed to give up their

weapons and military equipment, with the exception of the
officers' pistols, personal baggage, and private horses.

In

addition, each company or regimental commander was required
to "sign a parole for the men of their commands" not to take
up arms against the Union, until properly exchanged, while
the officers signed personal paroles to the same effect.
When this was accomplished, Grant promised that "each officer
and man . . . [would] be allowed to return to their homes,
not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as
they observe[d] their paroles and the laws in force where
they r e s i d e . "29

Again, as at Vicksburg, Grant offered to

allow the Confederate soldiers to go home, and live
undisturbed unless they violated the surrender terms.

Even

as Lee's army carried out the formalities of surrender, Grant
treated his former adversaries with sensitivity.

"When news

of the surrender first reached" the Army of the Potomac's
lines at Appomattox, his troops "commenced firing a salute of
a hundred guns in the honor of the vict o r y ."

Grant promptly

28 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. G r a n t . 353.
29 Ibid., 556-57.
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sent orders "to have it stopped" as "the confederates were
. . . prisoners, and . . . [he] did not want to exult over
their downfall."30
After Lee's surrender at Appomattox, the final events of
the Civil War were quickly played out.

President Lincoln was

assassinated, Andrew Johnson assumed the vacant office, the
remaining armies of the Confederacy surrendered, and
Jefferson Davis, the President of the defeated Confederacy,
was captured.

During this period, Grant helped bring the war

to a conclusion and returned home a hero to the North.
In December 1865, Grant toured the South.

He reported

to President Johnson that based on his observations

"the

citizens of the southern states . . . [were] anxious to
return to self-government, within the Union, as soon as
possible."

They were, he advised "in earnest in wishing, to

do what they think is required by the government," but "not
humiliating to them as citizens" in order to return to equal
status in the Union.

Grant declared that "if such a course

were pointed out," southerners "would pursue it in good
faith."

According to Grant, peace was possible, if the Union

under the direction of President Johnson and the Republican
Congress would only designate the proper course.3i
As Grant later explained in his autobiography, he
believed from the beginning of Reconstruction that "the
people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back
30 ibid., 559.
31 Senate Executive Document No. 2, 39th Congress, 1st
Session, 107, cited in Walter L. Fleming, ed., Documentary
History of Reconstruction (Gloucester, Mass., 1960), 51-52.

into the Union, and be incorporated as an integral part of
the nation."

But the North would have to take certain steps

to accomplish the reunion expeditiously.

Grant felt that

"the nearer they [the South] were placed to an equality with
the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they
would feel with their old antagonists."

The former rebels

"surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they
had a yoke about their n e c k s . "32

Thus, the essential

prerequisite, was to find a plan which allowed for the speedy
admission of the South back into the Union on an equal basis,
and with minimal insult to their feelings, while
simultaneously maintaining the fruits of the victory.
Although this was not an easy combination to discover, it was
the goal to be pursued.
In the eyes of many contemporaries, including Grant,
President Johnson refused to follow the guidance of Congress
and thereby failed to find the right approach to
Reconstruction.33

as

a result Grant, the military hero,

became a natural choice for the presidency.

Grant, rather

than Johnson, could deliver that office to the Republican
Party, based on his popularity with northerners in general
and the Union veterans in particular.

He was a popular

figure among both white Americans in the North and black
Americans in the North and South.

Unlike other Union

generals before him, Grant had defeated Lee.

He and his men

32 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. G r a n t . 567.
33 For additional information on President Johnson and
Reconstruction see, Foner, Reconstruction. 176-333 and Hans
L. Trefousse, Andrew Johnson: A Biography (New York, 1989).
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had won the war and helped destroy slavery.

As Frederick

Douglass declared to his audience on August 3, 1869, in
Medina, Ne w York, Grant as President,

"with powers augmented

and conceded, with a great party . . . behind him, with a
military record dazzling all over with splendor, with a
character that defies impeachment," possessed all that was
necessary to overcome the opposition.34

According to

Douglass, Grant held the power needed to resolve the many
difficulties facing black Americans and the nation.
But, by Grant's own admission, there was one flaw in
Douglass' projection.
politician.

The potential candidate was not a

Indeed, up until the end of the American Civil

War, the political arena held little attraction for Grant,
the civilian or the soldier.

His only previous personal

political involvement had ended in defeat.

As Grant reminded

the nation in his final Annual Message to Congress on
December 5, 1876, it had been his "fortune, or misfortune, to
be called to the office of Chief Executive without any
previous political training."

After his seventeenth birthday

he had but twice "witnessed the excitement [of] a
Presidential campaign" prior to his own election, and had
been "eligible as a voter" only once.35

Grant had exhibited

absolutely no interest in politics either as a witness to the
political process or as an actual voter, failing to even
establish his own eligibility to vote for much of his life.

34 Blassingame and McKivigan, eds., Frederick Douglass
P a p e r s . IV, 236.
35 Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII, 399.
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Further, his civilian business ventures, which had
consistently failed, offered no help to the potential
c a n didate.
Instead, Grant's successful experiences in dealing with
people came in the military context where he gave orders that
were to be obeyed.

As President, he would need to give

orders diplomatically and persuasively and to insure they
were complied with as requested, and it was precisely in this
area that Grant lacked experience.

This deficiency, combined

with his previous "press ahead" style practiced so
effectively at the swollen river and during the war,
seriously limited G r a n t 1s political skills.
Nevertheless, as the political crisis escalated and the
conflict deepened between President Johnson and the
Republican Congress, Grant was drawn into the world of
politics.
nomination.

In the end, Grant accepted the Republican
As he explained to his friend and wartime ally,

William T. Sherman, the office was not one that he would
"occupy for any mere personal consideration" but rather one
that he had "been forced into . . .

in spite of" himself.

Grant claimed that his refusal to run would leave "the
contest for power . . . between mere trading politicians, the
elevation of whom, no matter which party won" would
jeopardize "the results of the costly war."36

While these

statements appear self-serving, it must be remembered that
they were written to Grant's personal friend and that

36 John Y. Simon, ed., The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant (20
vols., Carbondale), XVIII, 292.
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throughout the subsequent eight years he steadfastly held to
these beliefs.
On May 21, 1868, General John A. Logan nominated Grant
to head the National Union Republican party ticket, and he
accepted eight days later.

In his letter of acceptance to

Joseph R. Hawley, Chairman of the Republican party, Grant
outlined the program he would follow faithfully during his
tenure as President.

He stated that if elected he would

"endeavor to administer the laws, in good faith, with
economy, and with the view of giving peace, quiet and
protection every where."

These, in simple terms, were the

basics of G r a n t 's plan to help the nation through
Reconstruction.

He declined to give further details,

for "in

times like" those it was "impossible, or at least improper,
to lay down a policy to be adhered to, right or wrong,
through an Administration of four y e a r s ."

Grant explained

that "a purely Administrative Officer should always be left
free to execute the will of the people" and that he, had
"always . . . respected that will" and would continue to do
so.

In closing his letter of acceptance, Grant declared that

"Peace, and universal prosperity, in sequence, with economy
of administration" would "lighten the burden of taxation" and
reduce "the national debt."
peace."37

And he emphasized "let us have

Indeed, this was the same clear message conveyed by

his surrender terms at Vicksburg and Appomatox and in an
April 1868 letter to Thaddeus Stevens, Chairman of the
Committee on Reconstruction.

37 Ibid, 263-64.

In it Grant recommended "the
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removal of the disabilities, imposed by the reconstruction
acts," on the Confederate General James Longstreet.
Longstreet had been a fierce adversary,

Although

Grant argued that

his behavior "since the surrender of the rebel army, and his
high character always, both before and since the rebellion,
entitle[d] him to the confidence of all good citizens."38
Later, when opportunity presented itself, Grant as President,
would extend, by signing the Amnesty Act of 1872, the same
consideration to all repentant southerners who behaved as had
Longstreet.
As the election neared, the nation undoubtedly pondered
the qualifications and skills of presidential candidate
Grant.

In light of the stated views of current historians

such as E. B. Long, Brooks D. Simpson and William S. McFeely,
it is interesting to note that the American electorate of
1867 had a very good knowledge of G r a n t ’s background,
personality, and skills.

Everyone knew of his plebeian

heritage and his work as a clerk in his father's tanning
business.

Indeed, references to G r a n t ’s childhood were used

as the title of a publication on his early years, which was
advertised in the May 16, 1864, issue of the New York
Tribune.

Readers were promised that the new book, entitled

"The Tanner Boy, and How He Became Lieutenant-General," which
was "written by a well-known author," would provide the
reader with "a complete and authentic record from boyhood to
the present time" of the General's life.

It also promised,

with total assurance, that when the work was completed it
38 ibid., 240-41.
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would record Grant's role as the "Savior of His Country" and
man who would oversee the successful "Overthrow of the
Rebellion."39

Grant's prior civilian profession was no secret

to the voters in the election, although the extent of his
failures in business may not have been such common knowledge.
His grim determination not to retire in the face of
resistance and his military skills were widely known for they
had been consistently reported to the nation throughout the
lengthy war.

During the conflict both the New York Times and

the New York Tribune described in detail the determined and
unrelenting approach of Grant to the military conflict.

As

an example, the New York Times in a May 26, 1863, editorial
cited Grant's strong points as a general as an:

"absolute

singleness of purpose," and "a most extraordinary combination
of energy and persistence."

These traits made him,

"the most

serviceable, and, therefore, the most valuable, officer in
the national army. "4°

The New York Tribune on the other hand

almost pitied the hapless Confederates confronting a
relentless General Grant.

The newspaper noted on May 14,

1864, as the Army of the Potomac under Grant hammered its way
into Virginia, that it was "terrible - this devouring,
unwearied, cold energy with which Gen. Grant presses the
enemy over w hom he has obtained an advantage. "4i

Only those

that had not read a newspaper or had ignored the events of

39 New York Tribune, May 16, 1864, p. 2.
40 New York T imes. May 26, 1863, p. 4.
41 New York Tribune. May 14, 1864, p. 6.
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the war, could have been unaware of this side of Grant's
personality.
Grant's war record was also well known throughout the
nation.

National newspapers, such as the New York Times and

New York Tribune had heralded each of his successes.

Upon

hearing the news of Grant's victory at Vicksburg, the N e w
York Tribune on July 8, 1863, proclaimed that "the steady
purpose, the unshaken fortitude, the fertile talent, the
heroic determination of Gen. GRANT, and the courage of his
noble army, are crowned at last with success."

The story

went on to proclaim that "Unconditional Surrender" Grant, by
his victory had divided the Confederacy, destroyed "its
political coherence," and "shattered" its military strength.42
The New York T i m e s , as early as May 1863, declared that "U.S.
Grant— or, as his soldiers style him, Unconditional Surrender
Grant" had "given the Confederacy blows such [as] no other
arm . . . [had] dealt" and that if he were not diverted by
the politicians he would "in due time bring the whole concern
to the dust."

The newspaper predicted total victory from the

western general.

This same daily, upon the conclusion of the

war, continued to praise Grant by reminding the nation that
"three rebel armies . . . [had] surrendered to Gen. Grant—
that under Buckner . . ., that under Pemberton . . . and that
under Gen. Lee . . . "

and that he was "the only one

who . . . ever induced a rebel army to surrender"43

42 Ibid., July 8, 1863, pp. 1-4.
43 New York T imes. April 11, 1865, p. 4.

. . .
Few who

read these articles and editorials could mistake that Grant
was the war's premier Union commander.
Grant's actions to hasten the end of the war were also
greatly appreciated and reported with favor in the p r e s s .

On

April 12, 1865, the New York Times, applauded Grant's
decision to send the Army of Virginia home in peace.

The

article asserted that Grant's peace negotiations made "the
cumbrous and dubious phrases of diplomacy . . . unnecessary"
and saved "the national authorities . . . the unsavory task
of covenanting with the political leaders of the r e b e l l i o n . "44
Grant's surrender terms not only brought an end to the
conflict in Virginia but expedited a national peace as well.
Much later, during the presidential campaign itself, the New
York Tribune also recalled Grant's efforts as a soldier and
military diplomat in bringing the war to a conclusion.

Grant

"was ever a magnanimous foe" and "he fought, not to degrade,
and destroy, but to exalt and to s a v e . "45
Further, the nation knew that Grant lacked "political"
experience; however, this was deemed a credit rather than a
debit.

In the initial stages of the presidential campaign,

his opponents questioned whether "success in war [should] be
the highest recommendation to the P r e s i d e n c y ? "46

But as the

conventions were held and the people moved to support Grant,
the New York Tribune ceased its resistance and acknowledged
that "the people had already decided that they would vote for

44 ibid., April 12, 1865, p. 4.
45 New York Tribune, May 22, 1868, p. 4.
46 ibid., January 6, 1868, p. 1.

ULYSSES S. GRANT, and nobody else."

The paper acknowledged

that it had "tried for a while to persuade them that they
could do better, but they would

not hear" of it.

The

Tribune conceded that Grant would win and predicted "that
both his Electoral and Popular majorities" would exceed those
received by either candidate in the election of 1864.47

The

New York Times on the other hand simply changed the handicap
to a strength by arguing that the nation would be better
served by a man who had no political experience or alliances.
In June 1867, the Times observed that the former General was
the only Presidential Candidate who was not so involved in
"party projects, so committed to special policies

. . ., so

hampered by having 'friends to reward and enemies to p u n i s h '
as to destroy all public faith in his disinterested
independence."

The paper asserted that Grant would "make the

public good" his "sole guide."4s

Grant's lack of political

experience was either overlooked or applauded.
Finally, no promise meant more to both the North and
South than G r a n t 's promise of peace.
press demanded it.

The nation and the

According to the New York T i m e s . he

offered the nation a candidate who could reasonably draw
support from both his friends and former foes.

On June 11,

1867, the newspaper argued that there was no "reason to
believe that the people of the Southern States would regard
. . . [Grant's candidacy] as galling to their pride or in any

47 Ibid., May 22, 1868, p. 4.
4® Ne w York T imes. June 11, 1867, p. 4.

way hostile to their w e l f a r e . "49

The General through his

efforts on the behalf of the former rebel soldiers at
Vicksburg and Appomatox offered the South peace rather than
war.

On January 22, 1868, the New York Times further argued

that "the temper and manner in which . . . [Grant] accepted
the surrender of Gen. Lee and the Confederate army and the
Confederate cause" had marked him "above all others, best
able to lead the nation to a just, solid and abiding peace."5°
The more cautious New York Tribune also deemed G r a n t 's
election a boon for the chances for peace.

As the election

neared, the paper advised the nation that "if Gen. Grant
shall be elected President no man fears, or even affects to
fear, a reign of violence or terrorism. "5i

Peace and an end

to conflict was the promise that Grant made, and the people
found it a distinct possibility.
Regardless of which of these factors had the greatest
influence on the electorate, historians readily agree that
G r a n t 's national reputation made his election almost
inevitable.

Historian Eric Foner contends that Grant had

"emerged from the conflict as the preeminent Union military
hero" and that as early as 1866 "influential Republicans were
[already] predicting his nomination."52
determined that by late 1867,

Brooks D. Simpson,

"it appeared obvious to all but

the most die-hard Radicals that Ulysses S. Grant would be the

49 ibid.
so ibid., January 22, 1868, p. 4.
si New York Tribune, August 14, 1868, p. 4.
52 Foner, Reconstruction. 337.
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Republican nominee for president in

1868

."53

william S.

McFeely concurred when he noted that "Grant's political
position in the spring of 1868 was unassailable."

He was

"hated by few voters and by no close observers powerful
enough to influence the electorate."

Further, he had managed

to remain aloof "from the vulgar business" of John s o n ’s
impeachment trial and "alone appeared clean" out of all of
the potential candidates for the office.54

McFeely also found

that Grant's position was further strengthened by a vote of
confidence from the Civil War veterans who met in Chicago in
that same year and announced their support for their former
commander .55
In any case, by 1868 Grant clearly was the leading
candidate for the office, and the American people concluded
that Grant could fulfill his promise to them.

They also felt

that they understood the man, along with his skills and
personality traits, and that he would make a good president.
His sterling military record and promise of peace helped
convince a majority of the American voters to chose him as
their President, and he defeated his Democratic opponent,
Horatio Seymour, by a popular vote of 3,012,833 to 2,703,249
and a electoral vote of 214 to 80.

As Brooks D. Simpson

noted, Grant's "vote totals exceeded by over 110,000 those of
the Republicans running with him, suggesting that he was more

53 Simpson, Let Us Have P e a c e . 225.
54 McFeely, Grant, 274-75.
55 ibid., 276.
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popular than the party and may have been essential to its
triumph. "56
Upon assuming the highest political office of the land
Grant brought with him his own varied experiences as a
business failure, as the nation's most successful military
officer, and as a political leader who possessed an almost
total absence of previous political training as a voter or
office holder.

In addition, Grant harbored a grim

determination based largely upon superstition, to finish what
he had started without altering his course.

Upon reporting

the decision of the American electorate the N e w York Tribune
declared that with the General's election "the last of the
great issues— the social and political Reconstruction of the
South, was also determined," and that the nation could "now
look forward to a long era of peace and prosperity."57
prediction was premature.

56 Simpson, Let Us Have Peace. 251.
For additional
information on the election of 1868 see, Foner,
Reconstruction. 333-345.
57 New York Tribune, November 4, 1868, p. 2.

The

CHAPTER 3
THE FORMER PLANS OF RECONSTRUCTION

From his election in November 1868 to his inauguration
in March 1869 Grant had several months in which to develop
his plans for rebuilding the nation.

He had certain distinct

advantages over his two immediate presidential predecessors
in formulating his blueprint for Reconstruction.

Lincoln had

been at a severe disadvantage since the nation was engaged in
a savage war in which winning was of paramount importance and
by no means certain.

His program necessarily had to take

into consideration the application of the majority of the
nation's resources to fighting the enemy rather than making
peace.

Johnson had faced a different set of difficulties.

Forced into the office by an assassin's bullet, he had to
make plans which took into consideration those of his
predecessor, could be formulated quickly, and would be
implemented when the war was ending and victory was at hand.
The newly elected Grant, however, had time to carefully
develop his approach to Reconstruction from his election in
November 1868 to his inauguration in April 1869.
addition, Grant had three programs to review:
Lincoln, Johnson, and Congress.

In

those of

He could have examined the

key elements of each of them in order to determine their
strengths and weaknesses.

Therefore, to fully understand
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Grant's options, it is necessary to examine each of the three
plans which had been implemented prior to his election.
On December 8, 1863, Lincoln had presented the first
Reconstruction strategy to the American people.

In this

plan, known commonly as the "10 percent" plan, Lincoln
stipulated how a Confederate could obtain a full pardon and
how a rebellious state could rejoin the Union.

First,

Lincoln advised that the only condition for obtaining a
pardon was that a person must "take and subscribe an oath"
and then keep it.

The oath required rebels to ".

. .

solemnly swear, in presence of Almighty God" to abide by and
preserve the Constitution of the United States and to support
the programs of both Congress and the President as they
related to the institution of slavery.1

Having done so,

individuals were allowed to rejoin the ranks of the Union
population as loyal citizens.

Lincoln's plan excluded some

ex-Confederates who had taken a leading role in the rebellion
and might pose a continuing threat to the Union.

This ban

included key Confederate governmental officials and military
officers who had held at least the rank of colonel in the
army or lieutenant in the n a v y . 2
Lincoln also outlined how seceded states could regain
their previous status within the Union.

Whenever one-tenth

of the population of a repentant state, based on the number
of votes cast in the presidential election of 1860, had given

1 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols.,
Washington, DC, 1896-1899), VI, 213-14.
2 Ibid., 214.
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their oath and remained faithful to it, then the people of
that state were authorized to reform their government.

The

new state was also required to adopt and insure a republican
form of government.3
Lincoln advised that he would look favorably on any
provisions adopted by the newly formed state governments that
recognized and declared for the "permanent freedom" of the
former slaves and provided for their "education."

He also

indicated that he would concur with the actions of any state
that used the same name or boundaries which had been in use
before the war.

The only states excluded from Lincoln's

rather brief Reconstruction plan were those such as Maryland
and Kentucky in which the government had remained loyal to
the Union during the rebellion at hand and, therefore, did
not require reconstruction.4

in the final sentences of his

plan, Lincoln reminded the rebellious states that Congress
alone would determine who would be seated as members of that
body in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of
the United States of America.

In this way Lincoln attempted

to warn the South not to send their former Confederate
leaders to represent them in Congress.5
Lincoln's plan had much to recommend it to Grant.

The

very simplicity of this proposal seemed to work in its favor.
It promised the speedy return of the states to their peaceful
and equal status within the Union on very liberal terms.

3 ibid.
4 Ibid., 214-15.
s Ibid.

Since it called for only 10 percent of a state's 1860 voters
to support it, the plan required little or no support from
rebellious southerners.

Moreover, Lincoln had to be

magnanimous if his plan were to be adopted by the South,
because he was still in the midst of the war.

In December

1863, although the North held an apparent and significant
military advantage, the war had yet to be won.

Thus it was

to Lincoln's benefit to offer peace at such a small price
compared to the severe cost of continuing a tragic conflict.
Grant, on the other hand, faced a situation in which the war
was over, but a true and lasting peace between the two
sections had yet to be realized.
For a period of approximately one year L i n c o l n ’s plan
appeared workable.

Lincoln, in his fourth annual message to

Congress on December 6, 1864, had reported that "12,000
citizens in each of the States of Arkansas and Louisiana
[had] organized loyal State governments, with free
constitutions" and they were "earnestly struggling to
maintain and administer them."

He noted similar movements in

Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee and proclaimed "complete
success" in Maryland.6

Lincoln confidently reminded the South

that peace could be obtained "simply by laying down their
arms and submitting to the national authority under the
Constitution."

He made it clear that his program of

Reconstruction was open to modification:

"If questions

should remain, we would adjust them by the peaceful means of
legislation, conference, courts, and votes, operating only in

6 Ibid., 251-52.
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constitutional channels."7
Grant also knew that Congress in its own way had made it
clear that the price of rebellion would be much higher.

In

direct response to Lincoln's 10 percent plan, Congress
approved the Wade-Davis Bill in 1864.

This legislation

challenged not only the President's primary role in
Reconstruction but also his plan as well.

The bill required

a majority of the white voting population of a rebellious
state to take the loyalty oath before establishing their new
state governments.

In addition, it mandated laws insuring

equality for black Americans in their respective states.
Lincoln responded to this legislative challenge with a pocket
veto, signaling the beginning of a struggle between the
President and Congress over the correct course of
Reconstruction.

While Lincoln, a noted debater and brilliant

negotiator, might have been able to convince Congress of the
justice of his position or have negotiated an acceptable
compromise, John Wilkes Booth ended the president's
participation in the debate.
Lincoln's plan, while simple and brief, offered limited
advantages for Grant.

Although this plan appeared to offer a

speedy peace, Congress had already challenged it and its
brilliant author was dead.

The plan's moment had passed, and

7 ibid., 254.
For additional information on Lincoln's
Reconstruction policies see, Eric Foner, Reconstruction;
America's Unfinished Revolution. 1863-1877 (New York, 1988),
1-170.
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even if it had remaining viability, Grant was not the
skillful debater or negotiator that Lincoln had been.
The second plan available for Grant's review was that of
President Andrew Johnson.

While the "accidental president"

did not immediately announce his own programs during his
brief Inaugural Address of April 15, 1865, Johnson did put
his plan before the country in a Presidential Proclamation,
dated May 29, 1865.

The new President offered an "amnesty

and pardon" to all who had joined in the rebellion.

This act

of forgiveness would be granted when the individual agreed to
"take and subscribe" to the oath provided in the President's
proclamation.

Johnson's new oath was much shorter than the

one proposed by Lincoln, but it covered the same basic
requirements.

It called upon the signer to "faithfully

support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States" and to "support all laws and proclamations which have
been made during the . . . rebellion with reference to the
emancipation of slaves."8
Of course Johnson, as had Lincoln, listed the types of
individuals who were excluded from his amnesty and pardon
provisions.

Those people banned from consideration were

divided into fourteen specific groups that ranged from
Confederates who had served as diplomats or military officers
above the rank of colonel in the army or lieutenant in the
navy and who had resigned from the United States military to
avoid duty in putting down the rebellion, to "all persons who
. . . [had] voluntarily participated" in the rebel cause and

8 Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VI, 310.
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whose "estimated . . . taxable property" exceeded $20,000.9
The President, however, did not absolutely preclude even
those who fell within these groups from receiving a pardon
under his proclamation.

Instead, he allowed for "special

application" directly to the President and assured these
excepted classes that "clemency . . . [would] be liberally
extended" if the individual maintained "the peace and dignity
of the United States."10
This Proclamation of May 29, 1865, not only outlined a
significant part of Johnson's program for Reconstruction, it
also informed the Union of two facts.

First, it established

that, as far as Johnson was concerned, almost anyone in the
South could be excused for their past deeds as long as they
were willing to sign the necessary oath or seek a "liberally
extended" Presidential pardon.

Clearly, this provision

advised all former Confederates that retribution would not be
an integral part of Johnson's program.

Second, the

proclamation revealed that President Johnson wanted to direct
the course of Reconstruction and that he expected Congress to
follow his lead.

Guilty parties from the South had to seek

Johnson's personal Presidential pardon which, in turn, would
not be subject to the review and approval of any other branch
of the government.

The South, it appeared, needed to

concentrate on satisfying Johnson rather than Congress.
On that same day, Johnson issued not one, but two
Presidential proclamations.

9 Ibid., 311.
10 Ibid.

In the second of these he

informed the nation that the rebellion in the South had "been
almost entirely overcome."

He advised, therefore, that since

the war had deprived the citizens of North Carolina of "all
civil government" it was now his duty under the Constitution
to help them establish a new and loyal one.

Johnson

appointed William W. Holden as the state's provisional
governor and directed him to develop essential guidelines for
a convention to revise North Carolina's constitution.
Johnson argued that this process would allow the "loyal
people" of the state to renew their "constitutional relations
to the Federal Government."

Johnson stipulated that no

elector for or participant in the convention was to serve
unless he had already "taken and subscribed" to Johnson's
Amnesty Oath.

Further, only those who were eligible to vote

prior to May 20, 1861, the date North Carolina passed its
ordinance of secession, were allowed to participate in this
proc e s s . 11

This, of course, excluded all new potential

voters, such as newly emancipated black Americans,

since they

had not been eligible to vote before that date.
Thus, President Johnson encouraged not only North
Carolina, but all the former Confederate States, to
expeditiously reestablish their relationships with the
Federal Government by state constitutional conventions under
his guidance.

Unlike Lincoln, Johnson did not require that a

certain percentage of the people take the "oath" of
allegiance before the state held its convention.

No guidance

was given on this question, thus allowing the people of each
ii Ibid., 312-13.
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state to decide how many people needed to take the oath
before they rewrote their constitution.

Johnson also

authorized the states to thereafter "prescribe the
qualification of electors and the eligibility of persons to
hold office under the constitution and laws of the State,"
thus effectively removing these decisions from the authority
of the federal government and allowing blacks to be
excluded. 12
This second part of Johnson's announced plan enabled the
former Confederate States to define their own state
governments and their relationship with the federal
government.

Even further, as part of his proclamation

regarding North Carolina, Johnson instructed all military and
naval personnel within that state to aid the people.13
Between May 29, 1865, and July 13, 1865, seven such
proclamations were issued, including the one for North
Carolina.

Johnson called on the states of Mississippi,

Georgia, Texas, Alabama, South Carolina and Florida to
accomplish the necessary steps to return to the Union under
the provisions of his plan.
During this same time period, Johnson continued to
dismantle the Union's war machine.

He sought to send

everyone, including the captured Confederate soldiers, home
and to insure a peaceful resolution of the nation's
difficulties.

For example, on June 6, 1865, Johnson issued

General Orders, No. 109, outlining the steps to be followed

ibid., 313.
13 ibid.
12
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in releasing prisoners of war.

Under his orders, all

Confederate enlisted men and seamen, as well as naval petty
officers, were to be released after taking the prescribed
oath.

Certain junior army and navy officers were released

under the same conditions.

Thus, Johnson sent Confederate

prisoners home with few restrictions and without
retribution.14
By December 1865, Johnson proclaimed Reconstruction
under his plan complete, but he, as Grant knew well enough,
had underestimated the reactions of both the North and South
to his plan.

Although his programs promised a speedy

reunification of the North and South, Johnson had failed to
take into consideration a wide range of issues which produced
a bitter and fruitless battle with the opposing Radical
Republicans.
The North, although lacking a specific plan for
rebuilding the South, had certain expectations of the
President's plan.

They desired that slavery, destroyed by

the war, be replaced with the northern principles of free
labor.

They also required that the South be placed under the

firm control of the federal government and kept in line so
rebellion would not resurface.is
Even more important, the Republican party had certain
demands that were unmet by the President's program.

14 Ibid., 340.
For additional information on Johnson's
Reconstruction policies see, Foner, Reconstruction, 176-333
and Hans L. Trefousse, Andrew Johnson;
A Biography (New
York, 1989).
Nina Sibler, The Romance of Reunion (Chapel Hill,
1993), 24.
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Republicans wanted the former Confederate states to
understand that they had lost the war and in that
understanding to accept the repudiation of secession, the
reality of emancipation, and the dominance of the Republican
party.

The Republicans required a repentant South, and not a

resistant one.i6
The Radical Republicans, a small and powerful sub-group
within the greater Republican party, added one more demand to
the President's program.

These "Radicals," joined by many

former abolitionists, had initiated a program in 1865 to
persuade the North that suffrage for the freedmen was an
essential element of Reconstruction.

Without it, they were

convinced the process could never be successful.i?
But, Johnson's plan did not include specific provisions
to insure compliance with these northern demands.

His

program was too easy on the former Confederate states and
allowed them immediate access to the Federal Government which
others were not so willing to grant.

Moreover, the South

betrayed Johnson's generosity by establishing the harsh
"Black Codes" through state legislative action.
In Mississippi for instance, the "codes" required all
freedmen to have written documentation of employment by the
first of each new year.

Failure to do so could result in the

individual being arrested as a vagrant, punishable by fines
or forced plantation labor.

Southerners even reenacted all

previous state laws that had pertained to the conduct of

Foner, Reconstruction. 224.
17 ibid., 221.
16
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slaves and free blacks prior to the war.

South Carolina's

"codes" limited the freedmen's choice of occupations in the
state.

A free black was welcome to become a farmer or

servant, but had to pay a special yearly tax to the state if
he pursued another career, such as that of artisan or
craftsman.

These state laws served to restrict and confine

the freedmen to specific roles within southern society and
denied them their political and civil rights.

Indeed, they

were in reality a southern attempt to reestablish slavery by
another name and method.is
In addition, many of the former rebellious states
decided to reelect to office the same men that they had
followed during the war.

For example, the Georgia State

Legislature sent Alexander H. Stephens, the former Vice
President of the Confederacy, to the United States Senate.
Many Northerners were outraged at the South's audacity.is
In response to these events, the Thirty-Ninth Congress
rejected and condemned Johnson's plans for Reconstruction.
Both the Senate and House of Representatives refused to seat
the elected delegates from the "reconstructed" southern
states.

Congress countered with its own programs by passing

the Freedmen's Bill and then the Civil Rights bill.

The

first of these sought to extend the one year life span of the
Freedmen's Bureau, which had been established in March 1865,
to provide aid to both freedmen and refugees in the South.
This government agency helped the recipients find jobs,

is Ibid., 199-200.
is Ibid., 196.
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sought to establish fair labor contracts with land owners,
and investigated freedmen's claims of unfair treatment.

It

was intended that the new bill would extend the b u r e a u 's
operations indefinitely and provide for direct federal
funding.

The second law attempted, at the Federal level, to

define the rights and privileges of American citizenship and
to prevent others, including the government, from denying
these rights to American citizens, regardless of their race.
Johnson vetoed both bills and initiated a bitter quarrel
with Congress over the course of Reconstruction.

On February

19, 1866, the president expressed "much regret" that he could
not approve the Freedmen's Bureau bill.

Johnson argued that

there was "no immediate necessity for the proposed measure,"
that it would "keep the mind of the freeman in a state of
uncertain expectation and restlessness," and would to the
rest of the South "be a source of constant and vague
apprehension."20
On March 27, 1866, The Civil Rights Bill met the same
fate.

Johnson informed Congress and the nation that the bill

contained measures which were unacceptable based on his
"sense of duty to the whole people" and his "obligations to
the Constitution of the United St a t e s ."

While Johnson

marshaled a wide variety of arguments to defend his veto, he
summarized them by declaring that the bill was designed "to
operate in favor of the colored and against the white r a c e ,"
that it interfered "with the municipal legislation of the
states," and that it promoted "the centralization and the
20

Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VI, 398-405.
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concentration of all legislative powers in the National
Government . "21
Congress passed both bills over the President's veto.
From this point on, Johnson and Congress struggled
continually over who would direct the rebuilding of the
nation, until Johnson's opponents sought his impeachment.

As

the New York Tribune argued the prosecution's case on April
20, 1868, Johnson was "an aching tooth in the National Jaw, a
screeching infant in a crowded lecture-room, and there . . .
[could] be no peace nor comfort till he . . . [was] o u t . "22
Although Johnson narrowly averted impeachment in 1867, the
conflict destroyed his power as chief executive.
As a model for President Grant, Johnson's battered plans
offered little, except an example of what to avoid.

Johnson

had turned to the nation and particularly the South for
support in his contest with Congress, and he had lost.

Grant

understood this lesson; in his autobiography, he observed
that Johnson had by "fighting Congress on the one hand, and
receiving support of the South on the other" compelled the
Republican-controlled Congress to pass "first one measure and
then another to restrict his power."

This conflict,

according to Grant, eventually forced Congress and the
majority of the Northern state legislatures to grant suffrage
to black Americans in the South in order to gain their

21
22

Ibid., 405-13.
N e w York Tribune. April 20, 1868, p. 4.
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support for Republican p o l i c i e s .23

Grant clearly recognized

that Johnson's plans had led to disaster.
When President Johnson vetoed both the Freedmen's Bureau
and the Civil Rights Bill, Congress had developed the final
plan for Grant's review.

It was intended to replace the

President's unacceptable proposals.

Since it was in effect

throughout much of the South at the time of Grant's election,
it commanded his attention.
In March 1867 Congress established the first major plank
of that program by passing the first Reconstruction Act,
which effectively divided the South into five military
districts.

United States Army officers governed these

districts and were charged with the responsibility of helping
reconstruct these former Confederate states.

They reported

directly to General Grant, the commander of the Army.

This

law effectively destroyed the state governments established
under Johnson and reduced his power since the military
governors no longer reported to him.

As a result, the

various states proceeded to draft constitutions which
authorized suffrage for black American males and established
state governments based on Republican support.

In July 1867

Congress passed supplemental laws which further granted the
military governors the authority to select and to replace
state officials when necessary to advance the cause of
Republican Reconstruction in the southern sta t e s .24
Long, ed.,
Personal Memoirs of U. S. G r a n t . 567.
24 For additional information on Congressional
Reconstruction see, Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of
Principle:
Congressional Republicans and Reconstruction.
1863-1869 (New York, 1974).
23

52
The Fourteenth Amendment had even greater significance.
Developed in 1867 and eventually ratified by the requisite
states in 1868, this amendment firmly established the
congressional approach to Reconstruction.
contained five sections.

This legislation

The first established that "All

persons born or naturalized in the United States

. . ., are

citizens" of this country, and in turn served to grant the
rights of citizenship to the freedmen within the South.

It

further prohibited any state from passing laws or acting in
such a manner that would deprive any citizen of his
constitutional rights under the l a w . 25
The second section was specifically aimed at any state,
particularly those in the South, that sought to deprive its
citizens of the rights guaranteed to them under the
amendment.

The punishment for such an act was to reduce the

offending state's representation in Congress in direct
proportion to the number of individuals deprived of their
rights as citizens.

The third section was aimed at reducing

President John s o n ’s power to pardon former Confederates and
restricted them from holding specified state or federal
offices unless specifically pardoned by a vote of two-thirds
of each house of Congress.

This provision empowered Congress

rather than the president with the authority to pardon former
Confederates.

25 For a complete copy of the Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States see, Eric Foner and John A.
Garraty, The Reader's Companion To American History (Boston,
1991), 1197-1202.

The fourth section of the Amendment repudiated the
Confederate war debts and declared that "neither the United
States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or
obligation incurred in aid of" the Confederacy or by "the
loss of emancipation of any slave."
declared invalid.

These debts were

The final section simply established that

Congress had the "power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."

Not only did

this final section provide Congress with the power to enforce
this amendment, it also clearly placed Congress in control of
Reconstruction.

Congress's plan had been made a part of the

Constitution and was therefore much more difficult for
opponents both inside and outside of the Government to
attack.
Perhaps the only weakness of the Congressional program,
as specified in the Fourteenth Amendment, was the fact that
Section 5, the enforcement clause, did not state ho w far
Congress was willing to go in enforcing it.

As was the

custom then and now, the framers of the amendment merely
assigned the enforcement responsibility to Congress.

They

did not attempt to specify within the document itself the
steps Congress would or could take to insure compliance,

any

more than did the framers of the Thirteenth, Fifteenth,
Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth or
Twenty-fifth Amendments.

As a result the decisions on

enforcement were left to the determination of both the
President and Congress as events dictated.

The plan did not

authorize Grant, or any one else, to use force,

for instance,
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in insuring the law was obeyed.

Instead it was necessary for

the executive office to seek Congress's guidance and new laws
if necessary to carry out any acts of

enforcement.

As time

passed this factor steadily increased

in importance as the

make-up of Congress changed from election to election.
Nevertheless, by applying pressure to the southern states
that sought to return to "normal" relations with the Federal
Government, the Fourteenth Amendment became law and was
adopted in 1868 before Grant actually
These then were the key elements
Grant had available for review.
the most to offer to Grant.

took office.
of Congress 1 plan which

The Congressional plan had

First, it was already in effect,

and it did not necessarily require modification.
was primarily a Republican party plan.

Second,

it

For example, the

House had passed the Fourteenth Amendment in June 1867 with
unanimous Republican support and unified Democratic
opposition. 2 6

Third, the nation, by the passage of the

Fourteenth Amendment, appeared to support it.

As the N e w

York Times described the situation "Congress, sustained by
the loyal States

. . ., [was] master of the situation, and

the South . . . [would] commit an irreparable blunder" if it
were to "spurn the proffered terms of restoration."27

Thus,

as the leader of the Republican party, Grant could have
simply adopted Congress 1 current plan and openly supported it
as his own.

Yet, strangely enough, Grant elected not to

follow that course of action.

Nor did he elect to follow in

Foner, Reconstruction. 254.
27 New York Times, June 21, 1867, p. 4.
26
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the footsteps of either Lincoln or Johnson by adopting one of
their plans of action or by attempting to establish his own
blueprint for reconstruction.

Instead, Grant chose a

different course, derived from the lessons learned from his
predecessors.
As Grant advised the nation in his eighth and final
Annual Message, he determined that "the wrangling between
Congress and the new Executive [President Johnson] as to the
best mode of reconstruction," had "much embarrassed by the
long delay" the task of reconstructing the nation.

Grant,

therefore, understood before taking office that conflict with
the legislative branch of the government would not be
conducive to an expeditious uniting of the North and South, a
process that he felt "virtually commenced" with his
inauguration.28
Grant also understood that there was one common element
to all three of the previous plans for Reconstruction.

Each

of them sought to rebuild a divided nation into one that was
at peace with itself.

Lincoln had sought by his plan to

bring an end to the war by enticing the rebellious states
back into the Union.

Johnson had attempted to bring about

peace by rapidly reuniting the states under a single
government with a minimum of preconditions.

Congress sought

a peaceful national unity, but with the assurance that the
South would be repentant for their transgressions and unable
to resume resistance and that the freedmen would enjoy civil
and political rights.

The common element in each was the

28 Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII, 400.
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desire to comply with the people's demand for an end to the
conflict.

By 1868, this desire had become the paramount

issue and as the New York Times reported,

"the whole country

repeats the demand

The Times

'Let us have P e a c e .'"

considered "Grant’s election as the harbinger of p e a c e . "29
None of these Reconstruction plans called for a continuation
of conflict between the South and the Union.

They did not

lay out plans for how a President might at the point of a
bayonet enforce a free and open election process or deal with
rebellious activities.

In addition the American people,

while considering Reconstruction, spoke in favor of peace and
prosperity, not of conflict and war.

As a result of these

understandings, he set a new course that would avoid conflict
and bring peace to the nation.

29 New York Times, June 3, 1868, p. 4.

CHAPTER 4
G R A N T ’S PLAN FOR RECONSTRUCTION

On March 4, 1869, Ulysses S. Grant was inaugurated as
President of the United States.

The new President's

inaugural address was neither spectacular nor long.

He

seemed to offer little information concerning his plan for
the complex issues of Reconstruction.
In his speech, Grant advised that he had taken the oath
of office "without mental reservation and with the
determination to do to the best of . . . [his] ability all
that" was required of him.

Further, he declared that he

would "commence his duties untrammeled" and that he would
seek to work "to the satisfaction of the people."1

While

these announcements appeared to offer little information to
the listener, they were, in fact, important for they
introduced to the nation G r a n t 's plan for administering his
office and resolving the issues that faced it.

First, Grant

assured his listeners that he would accept his
responsibilities and try to do his best for the nation.
Second, he told his audience that he had assumed an office
which he had not sought and that he was not bound by
political promises or preconceived notions of how things
1 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols.,
Washington, DC, 1896-1899), VII, 6.
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should be done.

Third, in his own way, he informed the

nation that his primary goal was to do those things which the
majority of the American people favored, but he did not
reveal how he would proceed.
Grant promised that he would "always express" his "views
to Congress," that he might on occasion "exercise the
constitutional privilege of interposing a veto to defeat
measures" he felt obligated to oppose, and that he would
"faithfully" execute all laws "whether they . . . [met his]
approval or n ot."2

These statements are critical to

understanding Grant's plan for his presidency.

He

established that while he would play an active role in
overseeing the nation's progress, his opinion would not
decide all issues.

Instead, standing law and the demands of

the people would be decisive.

These statements demonstrated

that Grant would not follow Johnson's path by insisting on
his preferences and rejecting out of hand the will of
Congress and the people.

As to formalized written plans or

goals, Grant, unlike Lincoln or Johnson before him, had none
to offer on the subject of Reconstruction.

Grant advised the

nation that he would "on all subjects have a policy to
recommend, but none to enforce against the will of the
people."3

He did not, however, lay before the nation a

program of his own making nor did he advocate the adoption of
any currently before it in his first address to the American
people.

By declining to formulate a proposal, Grant avoided

Ibid., 6.
3 Ibid.
2
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being challenged by any faction on the issues of
Reconstruction.
This in itself was no easy task.

Not only were there

the discontented Southerners who had supported President
J o h n s o n ’s attempts to bring the South back into the Union at
a minimum cost to themselves, there was also a wide variety
of other factions present in the nation.

There were,

for

instance, the Radical Republicans who were committed to
bringing about vast changes in the South.

For the most part

they believed that governments could not legally abridge the
natural rights— those of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness,"— of either white or black men.

They also argued

that guaranteeing fair and equal treatment of the former
slaves under the laws of the land, common and criminal, was
essential to their protection.

Further, they advocated the

granting of suffrage to black Americans in the belief that
this was the only way political self-protection was possible.
But this mind set of equality did not necessarily extend to
American social life.

There, the Radical Republicans were

more cautious and attempted to assure northern and southern
whites that they did not seek to place the black American on
an equal footing in the realm of social relationships between
the races.

In addition, the Radical Republicans believed

that the Federal Government was not only responsible for
making these changes but had the power to do so as well.

Led

by such men as Senators Charles Sumner, Ben Wade, and Henry
Wilson and Representatives Thaddeus Stevens, George W. Julian
and James M. Ashley, they had battled President Johnson over
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Reconstruction and they and their followers were prepared to
continue the conflict with Grant if n e c e s s a r y . 4
There were also the Moderate Republicans, led by men
such as Senators Lyman Trumbull and John Sherman and
Representatives James G. Blaine and John A. Bingham, who were
not willing to completely support their more radical
colleagues.

They sought to steer a more moderate course, one

which would allow the South back into the Union but only if
the new state governments were loyal to the nation and
followed the principles of free labor in the South.

Unlike

their radical counterparts, they had initially attempted to
work with President Johnson's plans for Reconstruction and to
modify the m as needed.

Even more important, they were not

totally convinced that black suffrage was a desirable goal to
be pursued by their party.

Rather, they looked upon it as an

issue which weakened their case with both Northern and
Southern whites.

On this point they differed significantly

from the more vocal radicals.

They also did not share the

radical belief in the enhanced powers of the Federal
Government.

Instead they maintained their more conservative

views on the "legitimate rights of the states" and a limited
central government.

Thus they did not believe that, as a

result of the war, the government should be entitled to
interfere in local affairs or give away land to the Freedmen.5
There were, of course, the northern Democrats who as
members of that national party had opposed Grant and the
4 Eric Foner, Reconstruction;
America's Unfinished
Revolution. 1863-1877 (New York, 1988), 228-39.
5 Ibid., 241-46.
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Republicans in the election of 1868 by running New York
Governor Horatio Seymour.

In that campaign they had argued

against the opposition's Reconstruction program and raised
the issue of race to defeat their opponents.

They attempted

to show that the Republican policies would place the South
under the domination of black Americans and create a general
intermixing of the races.

But their position fared badly at

the polls in 1868.6
Finally, there were many Northerners who simply wanted
peace, an end to the conflict and a return to more normal
times.

This group, although relatively silent, was of

critical importance to the President and Reconstruction.

If

Grant and his party alienated them, the President would
encounter severe political difficulty.

Without their votes

the Republicans ran the risk of losing elections and the
opportunity to make the changes they desired.
One final group, around whom most of the controversy
swirled, were the Freedmen themselves.

They sought to

protect their newly-won freedom and hoped to carve out a
niche in the "new" Southern economy.

They called upon the

government to protect their rights and to provide them with
the resources they needed to lead productive l i v e s .i
Given these divergent and often contradictory factions
and viewpoints,

it was difficult to present a speech or

program which met everyone's needs and did not offend
someone.

Despite his limited skills and almost non-existent

e Ibid., 338-41.
7 Ibid., 346-411.
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political background, Grant attempted to do just that, to
establish a flexible but unwritten plan that would meet the
nation's requirements and this remained his consistent policy
throughout his presidency.
Grant informed the nation that it would be "desirable"
for the m to approach the issues arising from the rebellion
"calmly, without prejudice, hate, or sectional pride,
remembering that the greatest good to the greatest number
. . . [was] the object to be obtained."8

Although Grant did

not tell the nation his specific plans, he hoped to resolve
matters peacefully.

Although flexible concerning the means

or process, Grant clearly had as an ultimate objective
"peace" and national harmony.
Only at the end of his speech did Grant address the
crucial issue of suffrage.

He deemed it "very desirable that

this question should be settled" by "the ratification of the
fifteenth article of amendment to the Constitution."9

This

amendment (passed by Congress on February 26, 1869)
prohibited the federal or state governments from denying a
male citizen the right to vote "on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude."

The adoption of this

amendment, which was clearly a key element of C o n g r e s s ’
expanding Reconstruction program, was the only legislation
that Grant mentioned specifically and supported directly in
his first inaugural address to the nation.

By recommending

it to the nation, Grant added his prestige to those who

s Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII, 6.
9 Ibid., 8.
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desired its passage, without seriously committing himself to
the overall plan of congressional Reconstruction.
Grant's position on the Fifteenth Amendment did not
represent a dramatic change in his viewpoint toward black
Americans.

Even though Grant and his wife Julia had owned

slaves before the war, this did not prevent him from
perceiving the need to provide freedmen assistance during and
after the war.

As early as the fall of 1862, while Grant was

waging his campaign against Vicksburg, he paused to aid the
freed slaves in Mississippi.

Confronted with "an army of

them, all ages and both sexes," and prevented by "humanity"
from "allowing them to starve," Grant sought ways to extend
relief.

Under the outstanding leadership of Chaplain John

Eaton, Grant helped set up a program which hired the slaves
out to plantation owners and the government to pick cotton
and they "together fixed the prices to be paid for the Negro
l a b o r ."

Although the money for the work was not turned

directly over to the Freedmen, it "was expended judiciously
and for their benefit."

According to Grant, this program and

one other involving the cutting of wood along the Mississippi
for use by steamers were extremely beneficial to both sides.
Not only did it solve his problem of dealing with a flood of
freedmen who needed assistance and prevented his army from
moving freely, it enabled the blacks to become "selfsustaining" and provided them with "many comforts they had
never known before."io

E. B. Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant
1952; Reprint, 1982), 221.

10

York,

(New

Later, as the war progressed, Grant moved to support not
only emancipation but the active recruitment of black
Americans into the Union a r m y . n

When the details of the

massacre of black Union troops at Fort Pillow on April 12,
1864, became known, Grant condemned these atrocities and
supported the administration's decision to halt prisoner
exchanges.

Since the Confederacy did not consider black

troops on an equal footing with white soldiers, Grant
recommended suspending the exchanges until this situation was
c orrected . 12

Although each of these measures aided the Union

cause by depriving the enemy of manpower or increasing the
number of Union men

in the field, the actions

aided the blacks in their quest for freedom.

simultaneously

Therefore,

G r a n t 's support of the Fifteenth Amendment was a natural step
for both aiding

the

freedmen and at the same time seeking to

resolve a point

of contention in the nation.

With a call for "patient forbearance one toward another
throughout the land," Grant concluded his speech and avoided
tying himself to any one plan, save for his stand on the
Fifteenth Amendment. 13

He had adroitly left his options open

and was therefore able to pursue a flexible program to meet
the stated needs of the people.

Grant had also avoided

challenging C o n g r e s s ’ power to govern and had made no lasting
enemies.

11 Brooks D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace:
Ulysses S.
Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction. 1861-1868
(Chapel Hill, 1991), 35-46.
12 Ibid., 58-59.
13 Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII, 8.

This short and relatively vague speech in actuality
contained all of the key elements of G r a n t 's plan for dealing
with Congress, the American people and the issues of
Reconstruction.

Grant had promised to seek guidance from

both the American people and Congress as to a preferred
course based on the laws already enacted or forthcoming.
Grant implied that the American people and Congress would be
responsible for the legislation enacted and subsequently
enforced within the nation.

By taking this stance, Grant

indicated that he would work within the parameters
established jointly by Congress and its constituents.
Together with this assurance, Grant advised that it would be
his job to enforce all of the laws regardless of his personal
views.

He would enforce both good and bad laws to the best

of his ability, thereby demonstrating their strengths and
weaknesses and allowing Congress to respond accordingly.
Grant also indicated that he would recommend legislation
for Congressional consideration, but he would not advocate
nor demand that these acts be adopted.

This approach was

devised to avoid the kind of conflict with Congress which
both Lincoln and Johnson had experienced.

Certainly,

Congress should not find severe fault with such a
recommendation, when they had previously been forced to
respond to Lincoln's and Johnson's specific and detailed
plans of action.

By taking this approach, Grant could

address an issue without risking a severe defeat or
rejection.

This flexible and deferential approach became a

trademark of Grant's administration.

Finally, Grant sought
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to capitalize on the n a t i o n ’s desire for peace.

Having

viewed the horrors of war and the devastation that it caused,
he consistently reminded the electorate that peace was
possible through forbearance in dealing with others and
compliance with all the laws of the land.
These then were the key elements of the unwritten plan
with which Grant sought to avoid conflict with Congress and
bring peace to the troubled Union.

Grant elected to guide

the nation through Reconstruction by adopting a flexible
approach and without making a permanent commitment to a
specific published plan.

He hoped to rely on the nation and

Congress to prescribe a legislative plan which he as
president would enforce.

In this manner, Grant could play

the role of advisor and law enforcer but not premier national
legislator.
Despite the brevity of his approach, as outlined in his
inaugural address, the American people recognized Grant's
program.

An editorial in the New York Tribune, of March 5,

1869, demonstrated this point by restating each plank of
G r a n t 's unwritten plan for reconstructing the na t i o n .

The

editor argued that "those who doubt the man's statesmanship
should analyze his brief speech, and see whether he . . .
left anything unsaid."

They divided the speech into a total

of 13 points for the readers' consideration, of which four
bear directly upon Grant's Reconstruction program.

In the

first point, the paper noted that he promised to "advise
Congress— but not war upon it," a critical element of
avoiding Johnson's unhappy fate.

Next, the Tribune
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understood that Grant had stated that his "business . . .
[was] to execute the laws" of the nation as President, rather
than seek new legislation.

The editors also found that he

had brought forth the key plank of his presidential campaign
in that the nation had fought a war and that now it "must
have peace."

Finally they caught the tone of his promise to

the Freedmen by noting that "as for the Negro,— equal rights
in all the States."14

This editorial clearly demonstrated

that Grant had been successful in expressing his plans for
his presidency and Reconstruction, and that the nation had
not missed his meaning.

It also demonstrated that others

applauded his strategy.
Initially,

it might have been assumed that Grant was

merely buying time in order to develop more specific plans
for presentation at a later date, but this was not the case.
Not once, in all his speeches and proclamations on
Reconstruction, did he seek to present his own allencompassing plan and then advocate its adoption.

During the

eight years of his administration, Grant on only one occasion
personally broke away from Congress' leadership and advocated
a specific item of legislation which he related to
Reconstruction.

In that one case, Congress rejected G r a n t ’s

plan.
Examples of Grant's determination to allow Congress to
lead appeared regularly in his presentations to the nation.
In his first annual message of December 6, 1869, barely eight
months after assuming office, he announced that the nation

14 New York Trib u n e , March 5, 1869, p. 8.
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was

"blessed with peace at home" and therefore no

exceptional actions were

n e c e s s a r y . is

while others might have

claimed responsibility for this sudden and surprising
success, Grant did not.

Instead, he praised the legislators

and noted that "the work of restoring State governments loyal
to the Union" and "protecting and fostering free labor" had
"received ample attention from Congress."

In addition, he

excused the legislative branch for not succeeding in all
areas by arguing that although their efforts had "not met
with the success in all particulars that might have been
desired, yet on the whole" they had "been more successful
than could have been reasonably anticipated."!6

In Grant's

opinion Congress, as the leader in developing legislation to
solve the ills of Reconstruction, had done a good job.
In fact, on December 6, 1869, Grant found little to
criticize within the Reconstruction process.

Not only did he

praise Congress for its positive actions, he also lauded
Southern freedmen.

The President concluded that "under the

protection which they have received" blacks were "making
rapid progress in learning, and no complaints" were being
received as to a "lack of industry on their part where they
receive fair remuneration for their labor."17

All, according

to Grant, was progressing satisfactorily as far as the
nation's efforts to reunite itself were concerned and no
recommendations seemed warranted.

is Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII,
ie Ibid., 28.
17 Ibid.

27.

Turning to the enforcement of the nation's laws, Grant
maintained his original position.

In his second annual

message of December 5, 1870, he proudly declared that his
administration had seen to the "thorough enforcement of every
law" passed by Congress.is

Later, on December 4, 1871, the

President announced that it was "gratifying to be able to
state that during the past year success has generally
attended the effort to execute all laws found upon the
statute books."

He added that his policy had not been "to

inquire into the wisdom of laws already enacted, but to learn
their spirit and intent and to enforce them accordingly."19
Grant chose not to question the validity of the laws of the
land, but rather to enforce them as he had promised from his
first day in office, and he maintained these same primary
beliefs throughout his presidency.

In his final message to

the people, he again reminded them that he had "acted in
every instance from a conscientious desire to do what was
right, constitutional within the law, and for the very best
interests of the whole people."

He also stated that the

process of Reconstruction had been solely "the work of the
legislative branch of government."2o
This then was Grant's administration program— to
consistently maintain a flexible approach to Reconstruction
without developing or adopting a specific written plan of
action against which all of his actions could be compared.
Further, Grant sought the advice of the American people and
is Ibid., 112.
19 Ibid., 142.
20 ibid., 400.
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recommended for C o n gress' consideration those actions which
he felt might be appropriate to meet the needs of the nation.
Once Congress passed legislation, Grant attempted to enforce
it, without consideration of his personal beliefs concerning
the benefits of the laws themselves.

Finally, Grant

continued throughout his administrations to advocate national
peace and forbearance.
Included within this plan was Grant's clear indication
that he would continue to support the Freedmen in their
efforts to gain political rights and to become self
sufficient.

Grant's support of the Fifteenth Amendment was a

logical continuation of his efforts during the war to aid
black Americans, through emancipation, employment and
recruitment into the army.

CHAPTER 5
GRANT'S COOPERATIVE PLAN SUCCEEDS

In the spring of 1869, G r a n t ’s administration faced a
wide variety of problems in dealing with the unresolved
issues of Reconstruction.

Foremost among these was bringing

the remaining states, which had seceded in 1861, back into
the Union.

Even though Congress had readmitted seven former

Confederate states during 1868, four more remained under
military rule.

Only Texas, Virginia, and Mississippi had

failed to meet the requirements of C o n g r e s s ' Reconstruction
program and in September 1867, they were joined by Georgia
when that state expelled its black legislators.

These four

states still needed to complete the process dictated by the
first and second Reconstruction Acts of 1867.
The first of these acts, after dividing the remaining
former Confederate states into five military districts,
required each state to hold a constitutional convention in
order to reestablish their new civil government.

The state's

voters, whose ranks in accordance with the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment included black Americans and excluded
certain classes of former rebels, were responsible for
electing delegates to this convention.

In turn these rebel-

free representatives were to draft a new constitution that
included a provision eliminating racial barriers to suffrage.
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Once this had been accomplished and the state ratified both
its new constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
would seat the s t a t e 's representatives.1
The second Reconstruction Act, which was passed when the
South failed to act, provided a detailed set of instructions
to the military on when the process was to start and how it
was to be completed.

As a result, the South acted and all

but four states successfully completed the prescribed
process . 2
While Johnson might have demanded these s t a t e s '
readmission, Grant demanded nothing of Congress.
part of his unwritten plan, he called Congress'

Rather, as
attention to

this issue and then relied on them to resolve it.

On April

7, 1869, Grant suggested to Congress "that it . . . [was]
desirable to restore the States which were engaged in the
rebellion to their proper relations to the Government and the
country."

Thereafter, he recommended that the legislators

take into consideration Virginia's attempts to return to the
Union on an equitable basis.

Grant advised that he was

"led

to make . . . [that] recommendation from the confident hope
and belief that the people of that State . . . [were] now
ready to cooperate" with the federal government.3

Grant,

however, did not insist on congressional action nor prescribe
1 Brooks
Grant and the
(Chapel Hill,
2 ibid.,

D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace:
Ulysses S.
Politicis of War and Reconstruction. 1861-1868
1991), 170-73.
176.

3 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897
(10 vols,
Washington, DC, 1896-1899), VII, 11-12.
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a plan to be followed for the readmission of Virginia or any
of the remaining former Confederate States still outside the
Union.
In spite of the fact that Grant had not called for a
specific action from Congress, his statements were received
with appreciation by the New York Tribune.

The newspaper

declared in its editorial section that the President's
message of April 7, 1869, was "eminently wise,
timely."

judicious and

The editor was pleased with "the immediate effect"

of his remarks and firmly believed that Congress would see to
"the speedy return of Virginia and Mississippi to their
natural relations to the Government."4
Throughout 1869, Grant maintained his position on this
issue.

As late as December 6, 1869, he continued to call

upon Congress to rectify the situation, while noting his own
efforts to bring about resolution.

In his first annual

message Grant explained that he had done all that Congress
had asked in its joint resolution authorizing the "Executive
to order elections in the States of Virginia, Mississippi,
and T e x a s , to submit to them the constitutions
each state had developed.

..."

which

Elections had been held in each of

the three former Confederate states, and Grant sincerely
hoped "that the acts of the legislatures of these states"
would receive Congressional approval "and thus close the work
of reconstruction."5

The New York Tribune continued to

support the President's position.

In an article dated

4 New York Tribune. April 8, 1869, p. 4.
5 Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII, 29.
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December 7, 1869, the newspaper noted Grant's stance and
called on Congress to "evince equal alacrity in complying
with these . . . judicious r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 6

Eventually,

Congress acknowledged Grant's appeals by allowing the other
Confederate states to return, the last being Georgia in July
1870.

In each case the state was admitted only after it had

reorganized a new state government in accordance with
provisions of the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and had
ratified the Fifteenth Amendment.
Although it is true that the southern states were
responding to Congress' conditions, Grant's low key approach
had facilitated the situation.

It placed firm and popularly

supported pressure on Congress to end this divisive
condition.

It also allowed the remaining states to avoid

being caught in a conflict between the two governmental
branches, which in the past had helped delay their
readmission.

G r a n t ’s support for their return had made the

process easier and resolved not one but two issues in the
Reconstruction process.

By allowing Congress to take the

lead and then pressuring them to act in a favorable manner,
he had alleviated tension between his office and Congress.
And he achieved his desired objective, the peaceful return of
the remaining four states.
The accomplishment of this goal was one of the few
successes of Reconstruction, and it did not come at the
expense of the freedmen themselves.

Instead, the reunion of

the former Confederate States with the national Union brought
e New York Tribune, December 7, 1869, p. 6.
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with it the adoption of both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.

These constitutional revisions sought to improve

the condition of the former slaves and at the same time
provide them with the right to vote.

The unification process

was also intended to establish a new civil government in
which blacks could participate.

These were positive attempts

to meet their needs, although as time passed these goals were
lost to the "redeemers'" intimidation and violence.
The ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment was another
successful outcome of Grant's unwritten plan emphasizing
cooperation with Congress.
1870.

It took place on February 2,

This measure, as proposed by Congress and ratified by

the nation, extended the right of suffrage to black
Americans.

The Republicans believed that by its passage they

had provided the freedmen with the tool necessary to protect
themselves by voting for and possibly electing men to office
who would safeguard their interests.?

The President had

announced his support for the amendment in his first
inaugural address.

Addressing the issue of suffrage, Grant

found it very "desirable that this question should be
settled" at once and he hoped that it would be resolved by
the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment.8

Its adoption

promised to complete the congressional Reconstruction
process.
As ratification seemed imminent, Grant quickly countered
the impact of rumors that some states might repeal their
7 Eric Foner, Reconstruction;
America's Unfinished
Revolution. 1863-1877 (New York, 1988), 444-49.

8 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers, VII, 8.
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earlier ratification of the proposed amendment.

On March 28,

1870, the New York Tribune reported rumors in Washington that
the Virginia legislature was "preparing to abrogate its
ratification of the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment by a

coup de main."

But the paper learned that the President had

already responded to these rumors by declaring that he would
issue a "proclamation announcing the adoption of the
Amendment as soon" as Texas ratified the amendment and was
readmitted to the Union.9

By promptly taking this position,

Grant signified that he favored the Amendment and would act
to insure its passage.
As promised, on March 30, 1870, Grant notified Congress
of the ratification of that amendment.

In celebrating its

passage, Grant announced that it made "at once 4,000,000
people voters who were . . . [once] declared by the highest
tribunal in the land not citizens of the United States" and
it was "indeed a measure of grander importance than any"
since "the founding of our free Government."i°

Again this

support cost Grant nothing, since it was not a plan of his
making and the necessary number of states had already made it
law by ratifying it.

This demonstration of Grant's approval

of C o n g r e s s ' efforts to complete the rebuilding of the nation
strengthened his positive working relationship with Congress
and minimized possible conflicts.
Following his previous method of operation, Grant used
this opportunity to "call upon Congress to take all means

9 New York Trib u n e . March 28, 1870, p. 1.
Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII, 55-56.

within their constitutional powers to promote and encourage
popular education throughout the country" for everyone,
including the freedmen.

Grant hoped this would make everyone

a better voter under the Fifteenth Amendment.n

He once more

recommended that Congress take action, without giving
directions concerning either programs or funding.
define what he meant by an "education."

Nor did he

Rather, he

highlighted an area that would benefit from congressional
actions, but he did not seek to intervene in the legislative
process.

It was C o n g r e s s ' responsibility either to bring the

ideas to fruition or to ignore them.
Grant's call for Congress to consider expanding the
educational opportunities for everyone, including blacks, was
consistent with his frequently demonstrated desire to aid the
freedmen.

It followed from Grant's previous actions on their

behalf during the war and his declarations of support for the
passage of the final Reconstruction Amendment.
G r a n t ’s cooperative working relationship with Congress
also produced a positive joint effort in the handling of the
Ku Klux Klan.

Organized in Pulaski, Tennessee, in 1866, by

Confederate veterans, this loosely structured secret
organization made its presence known on the national level by
1868.

Klan members, often acting on their own decisions

rather than those of their leaders, sought through violence
and intimidation to influence the outcome of elections in

11

Ibid., 56.
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southern s t a t e s . 12

as time passed the organization spread to

other states, until on August 28, 1869, James Abram Garfield,
a staunch Radical Republican, warned southerners that if they
persisted "in forming Ku Klux Klans in the South to murder
Union men, white or black" that the North would "use the
bayonet."

Further, he declared that it was the government's

intent to "see the rights, liberties and lives of Union men,
white and black, protected." 15

clearly, declared the Tribune.

the Klan "who scourges, robs, and sometimes kills,
inoffensive Negroes" had captured national attention .14

By

March 1870, Congress was in the process of investigating "the
necessity of using the United States forces in maintaining
order" in such states as Tennessee.15
Left to its own devices, Congress acted to restrain the
activities of such violent pressure groups.

In May 1870 it

passed legislation commonly known as the "Enforcement Act" to
help curtail discriminatory abuses in the election process.
The bill prohibited state authorities from excluding voters
based on race and authorized the President to investigate
such abuses through the use of election administrators.
These individuals in turn were authorized to pursue the

i2 George C. Rable, But There Was No Peace;
The Role of
Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction (Athens, 1984),
69-72.
For additional information on the Klan see, Allen W.
Trelease, White Terror;
The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and
Southern Reconstruction (New York, 1971).
15 Burke A. Hinsdale, ed. The Works of James Abram
Garfield (2 vols., 1882; Reprint. Freeport, NY., 1970), I,
397.
14 New York Tribune. March 29, 1870, p. 4.
15 Ibid., March 25, 1870, p. 1.
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federal prosecution of persons committing election f r a u d . is
The Klan took no notice of the new law, because no one within
the Federal Government attempted to enforce it.

This

reluctance to act was based on a belief shared by Grant and
many other key Republicans that the Federal authorities could
only act after the State Governors had depleted their own
resources in trying to resolve the crisis.

Faced only with a

threat of punishment, the Klan continued its violent w a y s . 17
Despite Klan actions and the national response, Grant
made no direct reference to them in his first inaugural
address nor in his first annual message.

When he did finally

take note of their activities in his second annual message of
December 5, 1870, he merely advised that it was "to be
regretted . . . that a free exercise of the elective
franchise" had been altered "by violence and intimidation"
and that the right to vote had been "denied to citizens in
exceptional cases in several of the States lately in
rebellion."i0 But he proposed no new special legislation to
resolve the problem.

In typical fashion, he left the matter

of a regulatory response to Congress.
When the K l a n ’s activities continued unabated, however,
Grant did eventually take action under the legislation of May
1870 to combat violence in the South.

He first provided

reports on these occurrences as requested by Congress.
example, on January 13, 1871, Grant forwarded extensive

16 Foner, Reconstruction. 454.
17 Trelease, White Te r r o r . 215, 385.
i0 Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII, 96.

For

reports from the War Department "relative to the outrages in
North Carolina and . . . the other Southern States."is Then
he provided additional information in a special message to
Congress, dated March 23, 1871.

In it he contended that "a

condition of affairs . . . exist[ed] in some of the States of
the Union rendering life and property insecure."

The

President believed that "the power [needed] to correct these
evils" went well "beyond the control of the State
authorities"; he was uncertain whether or not "acting within
the limits of existing laws" he could control the situation
by use of Federal authority.

Therefore, Grant "urgently

recommend[e d ] such legislation as in the judgment of Congress
shall eventually secure life, liberty, and property and the
enforcement of the l a w . "20

as

on previous occasions, Grant

recommended that Congress act, but he did not tell them what
he specifically wanted or needed to solve the crisis.

It

was, as usual, left to the legislators to find the answers to
the questions posed by this crisis.
Congress acted quickly and passed the second enforcement
act in April 1871.

This law's provisions were stronger than

those of the first act and were aimed specifically at groups
like the Ku Klux Klan.

The legislation declared that any

acts by organizations bearing firearms, such as the Klan,
could be defined by the President of the United States as
rebellion and dealt with by federal military force.

In

addition it identified specific crimes which were punishable

is Ibid., 117.
20 ibid., 127.
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under federal instead of state law.

These crimes included

conspiring to deprive individuals of their legal rights to
vote, obtain public office, serve on juries, and be equally
protected by the law.

Grant was also authorized to use the

military as necessary and to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus to help suppress the activities of such g r o u p s . 21
Congress, therefore, provided Grant with the specific laws
that he felt he needed to enforce peace in the South and
could exercise in accordance with his perception of the
appropriate powers of the President.

Armed with this new

legislation, he did exactly that.
On May 3, 1871, Grant announced his intention to use
this new law "to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution of the United St a t e s ."

He

called upon "all good citizens, and especially upon all
public officers, to be zealous in the enforcement" of this
new legislation.

He warned insurgents "to abstain from

committing any of the acts" precluded by its provisions.
Grant also told the nation that the failure of both the
people and the state governments to resolve the crisis
created by rebellious individuals would impose upon the
federal government "the duty of putting forth all its
energies for the protection of its citizens of every race and
color and for the restoration of peace and order throughout
the entire country . "22

21
22

Foner, Reconstruction. 455.
Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII,

134-35.
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Speeches alone did not curb the acts of violence and
intimidation, and Grant acted accordingly.

After issuing yet

another warning proclamation on October 12, 1871, which
identified nine counties in South Carolina as being in a
state of rebellion, Grant suspended the writ of habeas corpus
in these counties on October 17, 1871.

Federal marshals and

the military under orders from Grant and armed with this new
authority promptly moved against the insurgents and their
armed organizations.23

Grant had proceeded only after

Congress had taken the initiative by providing him with new
legislation which he could enforce.
In this case Grant's operational plan was successful.
As the President reported in his third annual message to the
nation on December 4, 1871, he had used "the act of Congress
approved on April 20, 1871, and commonly known as the Ku-Klux
law" to defeat that organization in South Carolina.

Grant

claimed that individuals presumed to be "members of such
unlawful combinations" had been arrested.

Approximately 168

alleged criminals were, according to the President, delivered
to the authorities in the counties of York and S p a r t a n b u r g . 24
Grant further alleged that once "it appeared that the
authorities of the United States were about to take vigorous
measures to enforce the law" others who had participated in
the rebellious activities had fled to avoid p r o s e c u t i o n . 25

23 ibid., 137.
24 ibid., 150-51.
25 ibid., 151.

Although Grant acknowledged that the affairs within the
South were "unhappily, not such as all true patriotic
citizens would like to see," he seemed satisfied with the
results and refrained from calling for further legislation.
Instead, Grant reflected on his vision of a happier future,
"when the old citizens" of the South would "take an interest
in public affairs,

. . . vote for men representing their

views, and tolerate the same freedom of expression and
ballot" for those who held opposing positions.

By the time

of the 1872 presidential election, federal military troops
and marshals had broken the K l a n ’s p o w e r .26

Unfortunately for

the nation, Grant's vision regarding a happier time did not
materialize.
The President's unwritten strategy was successful in
dealing with insurgents in the South.

Grant had called upon

Congress for legislation, without specifying what he wanted
or needed.

Upon receiving the empowering legislation, he

proved willing and able to enforce the laws in the South.
Grant's simple, unpublished plan to suggest but not demand,
to encourage Congress to look at certain problems and to
solve them, worked well in his first term as President.

It

helped him maintain a reasonable working relationship with
Congress and a general peace in the nation.

As Grant's

presidency progressed through the first four years, the
President retained his original methodology of dealing with
Congress and the nation.

To have done otherwise would have

26 Trelease, White Terror, 399-418;
Reconstruction. 457-59.

see also, Foner,
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required him to reverse course in conflict with his
fundamental persona.
This is not to contend that Grant's plan and
administration did not encounter resistance from other groups
within the country.

It had of course drawn attacks from the

Democratic party, which resisted his actions while minimizing
or ignoring the unlawful acts of such groups as the

K l a n . 27

Grant had also drawn resistance from within his own political
organization, and fractures in party unity appeared during
his first administration.
One such break occurred when Senator Charles Sumner from
Massachusetts, a Radical Republican, came to resist Grant's
actions and then supported his opponent in the presidential
election of 1872.

Sumner in 1870 authored the Civil Rights

Bill, which proposed guaranteeing the freedmen equal access
to public transportation, room accommodations, common
carriers, churches, public schools, and jury service.

Sumner

argued that the passage of this bill would have insured that
the nation lived up to the promises made to black Americans.
This legislation repeatedly failed passage.

It met

resistance from many diverse sectors, including members of
the GOP.

In part, Sumner blamed Grant for this failure

because he felt the President could have forced the bill
through Congress.

As a result, he turned from Grant and

endorsed Horace Greeley, another former Republican who had
also broken with the President.

In so doing the senator

27 Trelease, White T e r r o r . 389-96.
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helped fragment Republican ranks and disrupted Grant's
pursuit of total party unity.
Horace Greeley, the owner and editor of the New York
T r i b u n e . had broken with the President in 1871 over the need
for a quick end to Reconstruction and chose to run against
him in the 1872 election.

Greeley's defection was a severe

b low to Grant in that he not only faced a member of his own
party in the election but also lost the support of an
influential Republican newspaper.

In turn, the Democrats,

recognizing that they could not run their own candidate with
any hope of beating Grant, threw their support behind Greeley
as well.

As the campaign developed, Greeley ran on a

platform which advocated a return to local home rule, amnesty
for the former rebels, and civil service reform.

He also

called upon the people to forget the tragedy of the war and
forgive their enemies so that Republican Reconstruction could
be brought to an end. 28

This forced Grant to fight a campaign

on two fronts, one against breakaway Republicans and the
other against the Democratic party.
G r a n t 's plan of minimizing resistance and allowing
others to recommend and lead paid off in this situation.
Supporters, such as the New York Times, who agreed with his
desire for peace and the reduction of political conflict,
rallied to his cause and fought back throughout 1872.

When

the attacks became tiresome, this newspaper attempted to
divert attention from the more substantive issues by
searching for the source of the "intense animosity" toward
28

Foner, Reconstruction. 502-3.

Grant and argued that the real problem was not the President
but his inability to award favors to demanding office
seekers.
1872,

According to the newspaper's editorial of March 21,

"the curse of the Presidential office" could be found

in the necessity of distributing offices to those who sought
them and the fact that there were "many places to give away,
and there . . . [were] about ten times as many applicants as
. . . places."

Thus Grant, declared the New York T i m e s . was

the victim of greedy and demanding office seekers who saw the
lucrative positions go to others and retaliated by attacking
the P r e s i d e n t .29

while this may indeed have been one of many

problems faced by Grant, it was not the most critical.

The

Democrats were proposing nothing less than an end to
Reconstruction and an abandonment of Republican policies.
This was the real issue that challenged G r a n t 's abilities.
Six days later, this same newspaper continued its
defense of Grant by first comparing his actions as President
to the promises of the Republican party and then declaring
that his administration had "been, in a marked degree, in
complete harmony with the pledges of the Republican Party,
and with what the people expected of it."

In April, the New

York Times argued that the "renomination of Gen. Grant

. . .

[was] insisted upon, not by him, but by at least the majority
of those who first nominated and then elected him."

The

editorial argued that this majority believed "that although
all of his acts

. . . [had] not met with unqualified approval

29 New York Times, March 21, 1872, p. 4.
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of his supporters," Grant had still "administered the affairs
of his office faithfully, and on the whole wisely and w e l l . " 3 o
These defenses of Grant provide evidence that he had,
through his unwritten plan, managed to convey his own basic
goals to others without alienating such powerful supporters
as the N e w York T i m e s .

Although his actions did generate

opposition, at times from breakaway members of his own party,
they did not create the overwhelming resistance that
Johnson's had between 1865 and 1868.

Instead of facing

impeachment as had Johnson in his final year of office, Grant
received the presidential nomination of his party in 1872.
Grant and the Republican party were not content simply
to exchange barbs through the newspapers.

Instead, Grant

sought to improve his position by supporting C o n g r e s s '
attempts to pass the Amnesty Act of 1872.

It proposed the

removal of the disabilities imposed on former Confederates by
the Fourteenth Amendment.

This legislation had in a similar

format been first proposed in 1870 and again in 1871, but
like the Civil Rights Act it failed to pass.

The N e w York

Tribune, one of Grant's detractors, had argued as early as
April 8, 1869, for an end to the "odious policy of
disfranchisement" and recommended that the former Confederate
States' political institutions rest "upon the broadest, and
therefore, the safest, basis of suffrage."3i

Both the

Democrats and Greeley's supporters continuously argued for

30 ibid., April 9, 1872, p. 4.
31 Ne w York Tribune. April 8, 1869, p. 4.
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the passage of an amnesty act to end disenfranchisement,
which they believed divided the nation along sectional lines.
On December 4, 1871, Grant stole their thunder by
throwing his support behind this legislation.

In his third

annual message to the nation he advised that "more than six
years

. . . [had] elapsed since the last hostile gun was

fired between the armies" and that it therefore was an
appropriate time to consider whether "the disabilities
imposed by the fourteenth amendment should be removed."
Grant went on to argue that no additional benefits would be
gained by continuing to exclude anyone, with the possible
exception of "any great criminals," from e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t .32
He recommended the matter for Congr e s s ' careful
consideration, and in so doing signified his support for the
proposal;

in the name of good will and peaceful coexistence

he had removed this issue from the opposition's arsenal.

The

N e w York Times promptly backed the President and argued on
December 9, 1871, that there was much to support the removal
"of those disabilities which experience . . . [had] proved .
. . a mistake to impose."

The newspaper followed the same

line of reasoning by pointing out that once they were
enfranchised the former Confederates "would . . . turn their
entire attention to the work of honest and effective
government, to the maintenance of order . . ., and the
promotion of local industry and commerce."33

The Amnesty Act

became law in 1872.

32 Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII,
33 New York T i m e s . December 9, 1871, p. 4.

153.
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Grant's unwritten plan of quiet recommendation had again
proven successful by defusing a dangerous issue.
Grant defeated the opposing candidate, Horace Greeley,
in 1872 by a popular majority of 3,597,132 to 2,834,125.

In

the South, according to Eric Foner, the election "outcome
reflected the loyalty of the black electorate, a
stabilization of scalawag support, and the fact that a number
of Democrats, unable to stomach Greeley, remained at home."
In the North, Grant carried every state, and only in
Massachusetts did significant voter defections take p l a c e . 34
In researching this election, historian William S. McFeely
found that the effectiveness of the opposition was limited
because "Grant could hold the vote of Midwestern farmer
. . ., the vote of the freedmen . . . and he could hold the
vote of the soldier he had led into battle."

McFeely also

noted that Grant "the warrior stood for peace and for order"
and that he represented safety and dependability to the
p e o p l e . 35

Although part of his victory can be attributed to

his hero status, much of it must be assigned to Grant's
choice of methods.

It was Grant's plan after all to insure

"peace and order" in the nation and to provide the nation
with safety and dependability.

As a result, he had avoided

radical programs which generated opposition in Congress and
had acted to decrease the tensions between the North and
South.

He had supported those programs which were developed

and supported by Congress and sought to enforce federal laws
34 Foner, Reconstruction. 508-10.
33 William S. McFeely, G r a n t ; A Biography
1982), 383.

(New York,
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to the best of his ability.

His continuing popularity and

reelection to a second term appeared to vindicate his choice
of methods.

The Ne w York T i m e s . which had for the most part

supported Grant throughout his first four years, calmly
notified the people upon his election for a second term that
they "could hardly have a safer man at the helm in calm or
stormy t i m e s ."36
He had accomplished much.

In 1868 four states remained

outside of their normal relationship with the Union.

In 1873

all of the former Confederate states had been returned to the
Union.

In 1868 Congress had been at war with the President

and the office seemed in great danger.

In 1873 the President

and Congress worked together with the executive suggesting
action, and the legislature passing the necessary laws.

In

1868 sectional conflicts pulled at the nation's unity, and
disaster threatened its security.

In 1873 the nation seemed

secure from the threat of civil war and the activities of
such rebellious organizations as the Klan.

In 1867 most

black Americans in the North and South, as well as many white
Americans in the South, could not vote.

By 1873 the

Fifteenth Amendment had

The Amnesty Act of

been adopted.

1872 had removed the last restrictions from former rebels.
Although it can be argued that G r a n t 's plans had not solved
all of the problems of the nation nor even guaranteed that
the laws passed would be obeyed, the American people had
responded favorably and returned him to Washington.
margin of victory, which comprised over 55 percent
36 New York T i m e s ,

March 4, 1873, p. 4.

His
of the

ballots cast, represented the largest majority since the
election of Andrew Jackson in 1832.

Grant's unwritten

program for conflict avoidance and peace seemed to have
worked well.

CHAPTER 6
GRANT'S COOPERATIVE PLAN FALTERS

Grant's planned course of action for dealing with
Congress and the nation, although relatively successful for
the first four years, was not foolproof.

The weakness of

this course of action was that Grant had offered very little
in the way of guidance to the nation.

As the captain of the

ship of state, he had left it up to the crew (Congress), and
the passengers

(the American people), to decide the ship's

final course.

A captainless ship could run aground.

Yet another enemy of Grant's plan was time itself.

As

long as loyal and sympathetic Republicans maintained control
of Congress and the people remained interested in
Reconstruction, his plan could work.

But, if with the

passage of time the Republicans lost control over Congress or
key Republicans like Sumner and Greeley continued to abandon
Grant or the people themselves grew tired of Reconstruction,
the Republican program of rebuilding the nation might falter
without executive leadership.

This latter hazard offered the

greatest threat to the continued operation of the cooperative
relationship between Grant and Congress.

If the American

people lost interest in the burdensome issues of race and
Reconstruction, then Grant's administration would be cast
adrift without the people's guidance.
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On December 2, 1872, Grant claimed that disorder in the
South had been greatly reduced.

The president predicted the

complete suppression of "combinations" prohibited by the
enforcement acts in the near future,

"when the obvious

advantages of good order and peace" would prevail.i

But the

time of which Grant spoke never arrived.
The reasons for this failure were clear.

Grant had

overestimated the strength of his position, which steadily
eroded over the next four years.

The forces weakening his

authority included economic disaster, accusations of
corruption, the determined intervention of the opponents of
Republican Reconstruction, and the general weariness of the
American people in the face of rapid social change.

To these

was added the growing opposition from within his own p a r t y . 2
in each case Grant's course of action faltered, and the
administration drifted without congressional leadership.
This is not to say that Grant did not attempt to head
off his opposition and to mend political fences, for in fact
he made significant attempts to do just that.
not work.

But they did

For example, when Sumner broke with the President

prior to the election of 1872, Grant understood the basis of
this fracture was, in part, his failure to push through
Sumner's Civil Rights Bill.

Although Grant had offered his

1 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols.,
Washington, DC, 1896-1899),VII, 99.
2 Brooks D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace;
Ulysses S.
Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction. 1861-1868
(Chapel Hill, 1991), 252-54.
See also, Eric Foner,
Reconstruction;
America's Unfinished Revolution. 1863-1877
(New York, 1988), 512-63.
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support and made it known through the newspapers "that he
sympathized fully with the [freedmen's] desire to obtain the
rights of citizens" and "that all citizens should be equal,"
he still needed to win men like Sumner over to his c a m p . 3

in

an attempt to remedy this deficiency, Grant in his second
inaugural address, threw his support behind the premise of
the Civil Rights Bill, if not the bill itself.
In his address, delivered in March 1873, he noted that
although "the effects of the late strife . . . [had] been to
free the slave and make him a citizen," the freedmen still
did not possess "the civil rights which citizenship should
carry with it."

Grant declared that this situation was

"wrong, and should be corrected" and that he stood
"committed, so far as Executive influence . . . [could]
avail" to accomplishing that task.

He called upon the nation

to give the freedman only what he deserved,

"a fair chance to

develop what there . . . [was] good in him, give hi m access
to the schools" and when he traveled to grant him the
assurance that only his actions would "regulate the treatment
and fare" that he received.4
As he had so many times before, Grant elected to
advocate a position but did not demand the passage of
S u m n e r ’s specific Civil Rights Bill or any other for that
matter.

Instead, he called upon the nation as a whole to

grant the freedmen the opportunity to enjoy their rights as
citizens without interference and asked for the legislation
to accomplish this.

This message elicited a mixed response.

3 New York Times. November 27, 1872, p. 1.
4 Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII, 221.

The N e w York T i m e s , his standard bearer, congratulated the
President on his "blunt, straight-forward, and practical"
address, noted Grant's opinions on the Civil Rights issue,
and declared that it was "safe to conclude that all"
available "Executive influence" would be applied "to
accomplish this object."5

Others, such as the delegates from

the National Civil Rights Convention of 1873, called on the
President to thank "him for his continued friendship" to the
freedmen and "his recommendation to Congress to secure for
them the civil rights of which they" were d e n i e d . 6

Even

though Grant maintained this position on this question for
the balance of his administration, it had limited positive
results.

Sumner maintained his opposition to Grant's

administration until his death in March 1874, and it was not
until 1875 that Congress finally passed a version of Sumner's
Civil Rights Act.

Grant had been unable to accommodate

either his opposition or to insure the prompt passage of the
desired legislation.

This was in fact one of the more

significant signs that Grant's cooperative program with
Congress was no longer effective.

Congress had

Grant recommended, and the disagreements

not done as

and strife

over the

Civil Rights Bill continued for over two years after Grant
cast his support behind the measure.7
Grant's support of the Civil Rights bill is another
typical example of his refusal to abandon what he had decided
s New York Times. March 5, 1873, p. 4.
6 Ibid., December 13, 1873, p. 1.
7 Foner, Reconstruction. 504-5, 553-56.
See also, David
Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man (New York,
1970), 531-47, 579-80, 586-87.
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to support.

Even though Grant could have forsaken this

legislation developed for the benefit of black Americans, he
did not turn back.

He had announced his support and he

continued to offer his presidential prestige to bolster the
act in the face of opposition which successfully delayed its
passage for some five years and minimized its effectiveness.
But in spite of such failures, Grant retained his
unwritten plan.

As early as February 25, 1873, even before

his second inauguration, he utilized this approach once again
when he respectfully called Congress' attention to the
election abuses of the southern Democrats and White League in
the State of Louisiana.

As he described it, there had been

"an organized attempt on the part of those controlling the
election officers and returns to defeat . . . the will of the
majority of the electors of the State" in the 1872
presidential elections.

On his own authority and in

accordance with the provisions of the law passed on May 31,
1870,

"entitled

'An act to enforce the right of citizens of

the United States to vote in the several States of the
Union,'" Grant had ordered the United States marshal to
intervene and to use troops if necessary.

The result was

that "a full set of State officers had been installed and a
legislative assembly organized, constituting,
jure, at least a de facto government."

if not a de

Grant, however,

acknowledged that this "de facto government", was still
confronted by a second group of people who also claimed to be
the state government.

And he conceded that an investigation

of the election irregularities had revealed "so many frauds
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and forgeries as to make it doubtful what candidates received
a majority of the votes actually cast. "8

Yet, with all of

these difficulties so clearly documented and placed before
Congress, Grant offered no new solutions or plans.

Indeed,

he told the legislators that he had "no specific
recommendations to make upon the subject" at hand.

Instead,

he urged Congress to devise "any practical way of removing
these difficulties by legislation."

If Congress chose not to

act, Grant advised that despite his anxiety "to avoid any
appearance of undue interference in State affairs" he would
continue to support the state government that he had
recognized and helped establish.9
Although Grant proclaimed in his second inaugural
address of March 4, 1873, that he had sought "to maintain all
laws" and "to act in the best interests of the whole people"
during his first administration and promised to do so in his
second term, the task became much more difficult to
accomplish.io

By May 1873, he was again forced to direct

"turbulent and disorderly persons [Democrats and armed groups
of white natives in the State of Louisiana] to disperse and
retire peaceably" to their homes and to obey the l a w . n

With

Grant's presidential support and the efforts of Republicans
in Louisiana, the opposition forces were repulsed

8 Richardson, ed., Messages and Pa p e r s . VII, 212-13.
9 Ibid., 213.
10 ibid., 221.
11 Ibid., 224.
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temporarily.12

it is important to note that on this occasion

Congress passed no new laws to help curb this "turbulent"
opposition.

Grant was left to his own devices as Congress

failed to place new and more powerful laws on the books.
inherent danger of Grant's plan now became apparent.

The

If

Congress could not or would not think of new ways to prop up
Grant's administration by additional legislation and the
President's proclamations no longer commanded respect, then
the nation had no Reconstruction policy to enforce.
The crisis of 1873 and the ensuing depression further
complicated Grant's situation.

This depression diverted the

attentions of both the government and the people from the
pressing issues of Reconstruction.

The impact was felt

particularly in the North, where Reconstruction became a
southern problem to be tabled in deference to economic
issues .13
The changing composition of Congress compounded the
problems of depression.

In 1870, with all of the former

Confederate states able to send representatives to Congress,
the makeup of that organization began to change.

More and

more southern Democrats added their votes to opponents of
Reconstruction in the North, and Grant found Congress much
less cooperative.

By 1874, the Democrats had won control of

the House of Representatives, turning a dominant Republican
majority into a stubborn Democratic one.

Even though the

Republicans continued their control of the Senate, the
12 George C. Rable, But There Was No Peace;
The Role of
Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction (Athens, Ga.,
1984),122-143.
13 Foner, Reconstruction. 512-534.
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Republican Congress of Grant's first term no longer existed.
After 1874, when Grant went to Congress for guidance in
accordance with his flexible plan, the response he received
was no longer as helpful as it had been under a Congress
controlled by Republicans.14
Moreover, by 1873 the desire to confront the former
Confederacy had subsided.

During the election campaigns of

1872, Liberal Republicans had called for reconciliation with
the South and an end to Reconstruction as practiced by
G r a n t 's administration.

These arguments had found an

increasingly sympathetic public ear.15

Grant, as he delivered

his fifth annual message on December 1, 1873, acknowledged
this fact by again recommending to Congress the adoption of
an all-encompassing "general amnesty program" toward those
who were still prevented from participating fully in the
political process.

According to Grant, the number of rebels

still excluded was "very small, but enough to keep up a
constant irritation" and "no possible danger . . . [could]
accrue to the Government by restoring them to eligibility to
hold office."15

Congress responded positively to this

recommendation by adopting a program of general amnesty.
Yet, when Grant suggested in December 1873 that Congress
consider passage of legislation to "better secure the civil
rights" of freedmen, he prompted no immediate action in
C o n gress .n

14 Foner, Reconstruction. 523-24.
15 Ibid., 497-511.
16 Richardson, e d . ..Messages and P a p e r s . VII, 255.
ibid.
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But violence and disturbances within the South continued
and demanded presidential action.

Unrest in Arkansas

elicited still another proclamation on May 15, 1874, but the
political violence persisted.is

indeed, it appeared in one

state after another over the next three years as the southern
"redeemers" seized control of the state governments.19
In Mississippi, for instance, Governor Adelbert Ames, a
Republican, who with the support of black political leaders
had solidly defeated incumbent Governor James L. Alcorn in
1873,

found his administration under paramilitary attack.

July 29, 1864, Ames telegraphed Grant for assistance.

On

The

governor informed the President that an "alarming condition
of affairs" existed in the town of Vicksburg, Mississippi.
He claimed that unofficial "infantry and cavalry
organizations exist[ed]," in the city, and he had received
word that artillery pieces were en route.

According to Ames,

these units were "organized and armed without authority and
in violation of law" and had proclaimed themselves "to be
guardians of the p e a c e ."

He argued that although this was

clearly a "political situation" between Democrats,
"represented by the whites," and "Republicans, consisting
mainly of blacks," he still deemed the intervention of
federal troops necessary to "save many l i v e s . "20
Without direct guidance from Congress or any opportunity
to issue yet another proclamation, Grant responded to Ames
through the Secretary of War, William W. Belknap.
15 Ibid., 272-73.
19 Rable, But There Was No P e a c e . 163-85.
20 New York T i m e s . August 1, 1874, p. 4.

On August

1, 1874, the New York Times informed the nation that Belknap
wired Ames on July 31, 1874, that the President had received
the Governor's communication and had declined "to move the
troops, except under a call made strictly in accordance with
the terms of the Constitution . "21

Desiring to maintain his

policy of peace and reunification, Grant elected not to send
troops.

He feared the violence and political repercussions

that might result and believed that Ames had made no attempt
to solve the crisis by using the powers available to him
through the state government.

But Grant's refusal to send

troops did not pacify the troubled state.

In the absence of

federal troops, the conflict continued from August 1874 to
January 1975 as Ames and his supporters held out against
their more aggressive and violent opponents.

In December

1874 Grant issued yet another "Proclamation" and finally in
January 1875 dispatched troops.

His refusal of military aid

in the name of peace had only helped to sustain the
v i o l e n c e . 22

During this same period, Governor William P.

Kellogg of Louisiana continued to confront rising violence
and resistance to his administration.

On August 30, 1874,

according to Kellogg, six prominent Republican supporters who
had surrendered to authorities "were set upon and
deliberately murdered in cold blood," presumably by "members
of the White League of Caddo P a r i s h . "23

ibid.
22 Rable, But There Was No P e a c e . 144-62.
23 New York Times, September 4, 1874, p. 1.
For
additional information see, Rable, But There Was No P e a c e .
122-43.
21

102
On September 2, 1874, Grant expressed his concern
regarding "the recent atrocities in the South, particularly
in Louisiana, Alabama, and South Carolina" and declared that
they showed "a disregard for law, civil rights, and personal
protection, that ought not to be tolerated in any civilized
government."

He went on to advise that it was "the duty of

the Government to give all aid for the protection of life and
civil rights legally authorized."

Grant then directed the

Secretary of War, General William H. Belknap, to consult with
Attorney General George H. Williams and to send troops to
"the localities where the greatest danger" existed.24
Later in September 1874, Grant issued another futile
proclamation aimed at Louisiana and thereafter called upon
the military to assist the recognized government of that
s t a t e .25

under G r a n t ’s orders, federal troops were sent to

N e w Orleans and on September 18, General William H. Emory
asked for and received the capitulation of the "State" forces
in the city.26
In contrast to his previous actions, Grant was forced to
defend the use of these federal troops against the
recriminations of southern Democrats.

In December 1874 Grant

cited the Fifteenth Amendment as the authority for federal
intervention.

Any other interpretation of this amendment,

he

argued, left the "whole scheme of colored enfranchisement
. . . worse than a mockery and little better than a c r i m e . "27

24
25
25
27

New York T imes. September 4, 1874, p. 1.
Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII, 277.
Rable, But There Was No P e a c e . 139-40.
Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII, 297.
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Clearly, Grant found that his flexible plan of cooperation
with Congress no longer worked.

He had asked them to

consider new legislation and none had been enacted; so, as
promised, he had sought to enforce the current statutes.
Grant minimized the extent of federal intervention in
this instance.

This emphasis was consistent with the

President's constitutional proclivities and the evolving
national temper.

He noted that only 4,082 federal troops

were stationed in all of the garrisons between Delaware and
the Gulf of Mexico.

This was an insignificant number for an

area encompassing fourteen states . 28

Grant assured the nation

that he understood that "the whole subject of Executive
interference with the affairs of a State . . . [was]
repugnant to public opinion" and that as President, it was
his desire "that all necessity for Executive direction in
local affairs
obsolete."29

. . . [would] become unnecessary and
Grant had not forgotten the nation's desire for

peace, and he did not intend to make "Executive Intervention"
a common practice.
Perhaps sensing that his flexible plan of congressional
cooperation was no longer viable, Grant attempted to shift
the responsibility for solving these matters from Congress to
the American people themselves.

He invited "the attention,

not of Congress, but of the people of the United States, to
the cause and effects of these unhappy questions" in the hope
that they could help solve his and the nation's dilemma.
Grant believed that "if public opinion could be directed to a
28 ibid., 298.
29 ibid.
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correct survey" of events and "to rebuking wrong and aiding
the proper authorities in punishing it," progress could be
m a d e .30
Grant's attempt to shift the responsibility for
maintaining peace to the American people themselves was an
obvious effort to continue to use his flexible plan of
seeking guidance from others and then acting upon it.

These

explanations and maneuvers did not satisfy Grant's critics,
and yet another Louisiana incident forced Grant to defend his
actions.

On January 4, 1875, Federal troops under the

command of Colonel Phillipe de Trobriand removed five
Democrats, who claimed disputed seats, from the Louisiana
State Assembly house.

This apparent governmental

intervention at the point of a bayonet outraged the
President's critics.51
Therefore,

in January 1875 he provided the Senate still

another long report detailing political violence in
Louisiana.

Grant justified his decision for military

intervention by arguing that "lawlessness, turbulence, and
bloodshed" had "characterized the political affairs" of
Louisiana since its return to the Union.

As a result,

"a

shameful and undisguised conspiracy" had been organized in
1872 "against the Republicans, without regard to law or
right, and to that end the most glaring frauds and forgeries"
had been committed.32

He then cited one atrocity after

another, demonstrating the severe nature of the crisis.
30 ibid., 299.
31 Foner, Reconstruction, 554-55.
32 Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII,

305.
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documented specific examples of violence, such as when six
men from Coushatta were "seized and carried away from their
homes and murdered in cold blood. "33

According to Grant, this

evidence demonstrated the necessity of maintaining a small
garrison of federal troops in the area to provide Governor
Kellogg with the means to enforce the law "and repress the
continued violence which seemed inevitable the moment federal
support should be withdrawn."34

such actions, Grant

continued, had been essential to enforce the provisions of
the Fifteenth Amendment.
Having acted on his own volition during the crisis,
Grant returned again to his flexible plan for working with
Congress in the conclusion of this report.

He reminded

Congress that when he had first recognized the state
government headed up by Governor Kellogg as the legitimate
one in Louisiana he had called upon the legislators "to take
action in the matter" if they did not agree with his
decisions; otherwise he would "regard their silence as an
acquiescence" in his program.

Since they had taken no

action, his subsequent course was justified.

The President

once more challenged Congress to take take "such action . . .
as to leave . . . [his] duties perfectly clear in dealing
with the affairs of Louisiana."

He promised that whatever

legislation they adopted would "be executed according to the
spirit and letter of the law, without fear or f a v o r . "35
the formula no longer applied.
33 ibid., 308.
34 ibid., 309.

35 ibid., 314.

But

Congress once more failed to
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act; Grant's proclamation fell on deaf ears; and violence and
fraud continued until in 1876 only the state governments of
Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida remained in Republican
hands.

And only the presence of federal troops kept these

Republicans in office.

In summary, Grant's flexible approach

to dealing with Congress had failed to stop either the
violence on a permanent basis or to save the Republican state
governments in the majority of former Confederate states.
Why did Grant fail to alter his plan when it began to
miscarry?

Why did he not send troops into the South in

sufficient numbers to terminate the violence and
intimidation?

First, it is unlikely that Grant could have

sustained a decision to send extensive numbers of troops into
the affected areas.

Even the stationing of 4,082 troops in

the entire South had drawn harsh criticism from his
opponents.

Increasing the number of men would have drawn

even greater censorship, something Grant dearly wished to
avoid.

Also,

from the end of the Civil War in 1865,

Congress, with Johnson's and Grant's blessing, had worked to
reduce national spending and the deficit created by the war.
One method of doing that had been to cut the military budget
severely.

As early as February 9, 1869, Representative James

Garfield had declared proudly that "as the necessity of a
military police in the late Rebel States diminished," the
military had been allowed to decline until "the full strength
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of the army was 38,575 enlisted men, and a few less than
3,000 commissioned o f f i c e r s . "36
This process continued throughout Grant's
administration.

By December 1870, an article in the New York

Tribune questioned whether or not the United States could
defend itself in case of a foreign war.

The article declared

that the United States had "no army except a small, scattered
force, which could not be spared from its present duty," and
the Army had "no breech-loading guns" with which "to arm new
troops;" nor was there a "navy worth mentioning."

The only

solution was to "wisely conclude to keep the p e a c e . "37
Similar concerns surfaced during the crisis of September
1874 in Louisiana.

The New York Times reported that Army

officers believed "that the army . . . [was] not large enough
for the protection of the frontiers; and at the same time to
act as a posse comitatus to judicial officers" in the
southern states.38

clearly, to have mustered the troops

necessary to confront insurgent groups in the South, Grant
would have had to disregard the wishes of the American people
for peace and a reduced Federal budget.

Having promised to

follow the desires of Congress and the people, Grant would
not do this.

Nor would his own character,

fashioned in part

by superstition, permit the reversal of his intended course
regardless of the difficulties.

Thus, extensive intervention

was not a realistic option for Grant.
36 Burke A. Hinsdale, ed., The Works of James Abram
G a r f i e l d . (2 vols., 1882; Reprint.
Freeport, NY, 1970),
410-11.
37 New York Tribune. December 6, 1870, p. 5.
38 New York T i m e s . September 19, 1874, p. 1.
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Second, he did not want to risk either open or guerrilla
warfare within the South.

All of Grant's actions since 1862,

beginning with his victory at Fort Donelson, had been aimed
at bringing peace to the nation.

The surrender terms offered

at Vicksburg and Appomattox had been designed to send the
Confederate soldiers home and to leave them undisturbed.

His

actions as President through 1874 were designed to reduce
conflict between the North and South.

He believed that

sending large numbers of troops to confront the insurgents,
seizing their stores, arresting their leaders, and firing
upon them would have regenerated the conflict.
could not do.

This Grant

It was, he concluded, better to move forward

following an unwritten plan that did not work in all areas
than to forge a new one that risked all out conflict and
racial war.39
Finally, Grant on at least one major occasion had
already set out on his own and tried to convince both
Congress and the nation to do something that he specifically
recommended, the annexation of Santo Domingo.

The background

of the drive for acquiring the island was relatively simple.
Like other expansionists, Grant became convinced that
obtaining new territory would benefit the nation.

He

believed that this particular island would increase A m e r i c a 's
military and political power in the Caribbean.

Commodore

Daniel Ammen and Senator Cornelius Cole from California
convinced him that Samana Bay, located on the northeastern
shore of the island, would make a great U. S. naval base.
39 William S. McFeely, G r a n t ;
1982), 422.
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109
Peter J. Sullivan, William L. Cazneau and Joseph W. Fabens,
three businessmen who stood to profit considerably, also
helped persuade Grant of the plan's benefits.

Finally, even

the dictator of Santo Domingo, Buenaventura Baez, seemed
interested in joining his island with the United States.

As

a result of their persuasion, Grant decided to annex the
island with the Senate's a p p r o v a l . 40
Having made that decision, Grant marshaled all of the
forces available to him— his prestige, his supporters, and
his limited persuasive skills— to convince the Senate and the
nation that he was right.
would prevail.

At first, it seemed that Grant

As early as July 17, 1869, the New York

T r i b u n e . still one of Grant's supporters, indicated in a
headline article that "the annexation of the Island of San
Domingo . . . [was] admitted to be merely a question of
time. "4i
But as time passed the proposed treaty encountered
increasingly stiff opposition for a variety of reasons.
Within the nation there were those who opposed the
acquisition of lands overseas on general principles, while
Radical Republicans rejected the idea of taking lands away
from blacks for financial gain.

Some whites opposed the

treaty because they did not wish to expand the black
population that already existed in the nation.42

40 Charles S. Campbell, The Transformation of American
Foreign Relations. 1865-1900 (New York, 1976), 50-52.
See
also, Alan Nevins, Hamilton Fish;
The Inner History of the
Grant Administration (New York, 1936), 249-371.
41 New York Tribune, July 17, 1869, p. 1.
42 Campbell, American Foreign Relations. 52-53.

Grant's response to this opposition was typical; he only
worked harder to insure passage of the annexation treaty.
During the first week in January 1870, Grant visited Charles
Sumner's home in the hope of obtaining his personal support
for the treaty's passage.

After a short and friendly

discussion, Grant returned to the White House firmly
convinced that Sumner had promised his help.
to Sumner, no such assurance was given.43

But according

in fact, Sumner,

the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
blocked the t r e a t y ’s path.

As early as March 25, 1870, the

N ew York Tribune noted Sumner's speech opposing annexation
and concluded that the treaty would "not receive the
requisite two-thirds of the Senate in ratification."44

Sumner

argued against the treaty because he believed that annexation
would be extremely costly to the United States, and that
acquiring the island would only be the first step in
acquiring other islands such as Haiti and the rest of the
West Indies.45

He also pointed out that Santo Domingo was a

land occupied by blacks and that it should remain so, rather
than being annexed to an "Anglo Saxon" nation like the United
States.

In effect, Sumner argued the race issue in reverse;

he contended that whites should not mix with the black race
and deprive them of their island.46

43
44
45
Charles
46

Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights of M a n . 434-52.
New York Tribune. March 25, 1870, p. 4.
Beverly Wilson Palmer, ed., The Selected Papers of
Sumner (2 vols., Boston, 1990) II, 505.
Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights of M a n . 442-43.

In March 1870, a furious and determined Grant urged the
Senate to ratify the treaty annexing Santo D o m in g o . 47

Later

in May, with no action forthcoming, Grant forwarded to
Congress an addendum to the treaty authorizing an extension
of the expiration date so that it could remain under
consideration.

Grant expressed "an unusual anxiety for the

ratification of this treaty," because he believed it would
"redound greatly to the glory of the two countries
interested, to civilization, and to the expiration of the
institution of slavery."48

He listed his justifications,

which included the alleged desire of Santo Domingo to join
the United States, to the rich resources of the country, to
the fear that some other nation would annex the island.

Of

more importance to the process of Reconstruction, Grant
implied that the area's resources, properly developed, would
"give remunerative wages to tens of thousands of laborers not
now on the island. "49

Grant later explained in his

autobiography that he was referring to the persecuted black
Americans of the South.

Grant noted with some bitterness

that he "took it that the colored people . . .

[of the United

States] would go there in great numbers, so as to have
independent states governed by their own race."

He argued,

after the fact, that they would still have been citizens of
the United States and insured of its protection, but would
have been able to avoid persecution in the South.

The

47 Richardson, ed., Messages and Pa p e r s . VII, 52 -53.
48 ibid., 61.
49 Ibid., 62.
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settlement of this issue, declared Grant, had led him "to
urge the annexation of Santo Domingo."so
The validity of such arguments is clearly debatable and
Grant's opponents disagreed with him.

More important than

whether he was right or wrong was that Grant went out of his
way to obtain the annexation of the island.

He not only

openly advocated a specific proposal, which contrasted with
his earlier unwritten plan to avoid such conflict, but he
also called upon Congress to follow his lead in this case and
they refused.
On June 30, 1870, Grant lost the battle for annexation.
Congress soundly rejected the treaty.

The best that Grant

and his supporters could accomplish was a dismal 28 to 28 tie
in the Senate.

But Grant refused to concede.

He continued

to apply notable pressure to the opposition, so much so that
his chief opponent Charles Sumner found it very
discomforting.

In a letter to John Bigelow, dated August 7,

1870, Sumner advised that Grant "had but one idea . . ., it
was to annex St. Domingo" and that "Punishment & [sic] reward
were equally employed."51
The President attempted unsuccessfully to revive the
treaty the following year.
defeat.

Grant remained bitter over this

In his final annual message of December 6, 1876, he

broached the subject one last time and attempted to vindicate
himself by pointing out the error of the S e n a t e ’s actions.S2

York,

5° E. B. Long, ed., Personal Memoirs Of U. S. Grant
1982), 588.
51 Palmer, Letters of Charles Sumner. II, 515.
52 Richardson, ed., Messages and P a p e r s . VII, 413.
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The failure of the treaty clearly demonstrated that as early
as June 1871 Grant was unable to adopt a position on a
particular issue and then by argument and personal prestige
convince Congress and the nation to follow his guidance.
Even though it is true that Grant was, as stated by historian
Charles S. Campbell,

"butting his head against a massive wall

of opposition to southward expansion" and he "was out of
touch with the traditional and still fervent opposition of
his countrymen to overseas expansion," the critical point
remains that the President with all of his power and prestige
was not able to lead Congress where he wanted it to go in
1870.

How then could he have steered Congress into a program

of intervention by federal marshals or the military that
would have risked either heightened racial conflict or a
renewal of the civil war itself?

His only option was to

maintain the most reasonable cooperative relationship between
his office and Congress.

Any other decision, considering the

complexity of the Reconstruction issues and G r a n t 's limited
skills, might have generated a drive to impeach him, similar
to the one aimed at Johnson in 1867-68.
Ultimately, neither Grant's flexible plan nor his
declining popularity could sustain the weight of
Reconstruction.

As early as May 1875, under pressure from

the press, the Democrats, and members of his own party, Grant
addressed the issue of a "third" term in an open letter to
the nation.

Grant expressed regret that he was forced to

address that topic before the "competent authority" of the
political process rendered a decision.

He informed the
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people that he did "not want" the nomination any more than in
1868 and would accept only "if it were tendered . . . under
such circumstances as to make it an imperative duty—
circumstances not likely to arise."53

The Republican party

and the American people took him at his word and nominated
Rutherford B. Hayes as the GOP candidate.
The lame duck Grant did not give up on Reconstruction.
Instead, in the final months of his term he attempted to
insure an "honest canvass" at least in the remaining
Republican strongholds in the South.

When the election had

been concluded and the outcome was challenged in the states
of Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida, Grant directed
that the military in the disputed states "be vigilant with
the force at their command to preserve peace and good order;"
they were "to see that the people and the legal Boards of
Canvassers

. . . [were] unmolested in the performance of

their duties."54

Grant's efforts did not change the final

outcome of Reconstruction, the abandonment of the freedmen,
but they demonstrated that he remained committed after others
might have withdrawn.55
By January 1877 the South was firmly under the control
of the redeemer governments, with the exception of the three
southern states protected by federal troops.

Then, on March

5, 1877, as President Rutherford B. Hayes took office, the
last remnants of Republican Reconstruction collapsed.
Although Hayes expressed great concern over the status of the
53 N e w York Tribune, May 31, 1875, p. 1.
54 New York T i m e s . November 11, 1876, p. 1.
55 Rable, But There Was No P e a c e . 183.
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South and the conflicts which existed there, the new goal was
"local self-government."

According to Hayes,

"the

inestimable blessing of wise, honest, and peaceful local
self-government" was "the imperative necessity required" by
all parties.56

This return to "home rule" marked the final

days of the Republican-supported governments in South
Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, and guaranteed the
dominance of the southern Democrats.57
The response to H a y e s ' message was just as w a r m and
friendly as had been the response to Grant's, when he first
took office.

For instance, the New York Tribune, now freed

from opposing Grant, declared that President Hayes'
presentation would "give a fresh impulse to the revival of
hope and cheerfulness throughout the country."

As to his

policy for solving the "Southern problem" the editorial
declared that "the real South [would] take heart in hearing
it, and honest Republicans at the North," would "hold their
heads higher and rejoice in the dawn of a nobler d a y ."56
By July 18, 1877, the President of the United States no
longer issued proclamations to order insurgent forces in the
South to disperse and cease their activities.

Instead,

H a y e s ' proclamations against insurrection dealt with domestic
violence during the railroad strike of 1877 in Maryland and
Pennsylvania.

Then on December 3, 1877, in his first annual

56 Richardson, ed., Messages and Pa p e r s . VII, 443.
57 For additional information on President H a y e s '
administration see, H. Wayne Morgan, From Haves to McKinley;
National Party Politics. 1877-1896 (Syracuse, 1969), 1-19 and
Ari Hoogenboom, Rutherford B. Haves:
Warrior and President
(Lawrence, 1995).
55 Ne w York Tribune. March 6, 1877, p. 4.

message to the nation, Hayes defended the "discontinuance of
the use of the Army for the purpose of upholding local
governments in two States of the Union."

According to him,

this action was "a constitutional duty and requirement" that
"was a much-needed measure for the restoration of local selfgovernment and the promotion of national harmony."

Hayes

argued that "the withdrawal of the troops from such
employment was effected deliberately, and with solicitous
care for the peace and good order of society."59

Having

gained the assurances of southern Democratic leaders that the
civil rights of black Americans would be protected, he
believed the withdrawal could be safely effected.

He was

wrong, and the benefits gained by the passage of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments to the Constitution were
largely lost for eighty years or more.

59 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 459.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

It is upon this note of Northern capitulation to
Southern forces, that the Reconstruction process commenced
officially by President Lincoln on December 8, 1863, reached
its conclusion in 1877.

Four Presidents and the nation's

Congress had wrestled with the issues growing out of the
American Civil War and the destruction of the institution of
slavery.

Each group had attempted to bring peace and unity

to the nation, with some success and many failures.

The

roles of three of the four presidents are clear.
President Lincoln had attempted to use Reconstruction as
one more presidential measure to bring an end to the war and
had offered liberal terms to entice the South to surrender.
His plan drew opposition from Congress, and his assassination
foreclosed the possibility of negotiating a workable
agreement with Congress.
President Johnson elected to develop a plan of his own
design.

He differed from Lincoln in offering even more

liberal terms to the white South, although his plan held
little hope for the freedmen.

When Congress challenged

Johnson's leadership and passed opposing legislation, he
fought back.

By resisting Congress with bluntness and

determination, he helped destroy any opportunity,
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however
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slight it may have been, for the nation to reconstruct itself
between 1865 and 1867.

Johnson's plans were rejected, and he

was almost impeached.
President Hayes opted for withdrawal and an end to the
conflict over Reconstruction.

The retreat, which had clearly

begun during Grant's presidency, was completed during Hayes'
first year.

This marked the end of Reconstruction.

But, what of Grant,
Reconstruction?

"the tanner boy," and

His administration, which encompassed eight

critical years of Reconstruction, is often obscured by the
cloak and designation of "Congressional Reconstruction."
Yet, clearly Grant's decisions and actions had a significant
impact on the process.
Although Grant's plan of action, unlike those of Lincoln
and Johnson, was not specifically written down, it had just
as much impact on Reconstruction as those of his
predecessors.

As Grant assumed the Presidency, he chose not

to attempt to assert a leadership role in the development of
Reconstruction legislation.

He did not present for the

people's consideration a plan of his own design; rather he
relied on Congress to both plan and direct.

Grant sought to

reduce conflict within the nation by enforcing existing laws
in a fair and equitable manner.

He praised new laws, such as

the Fifteenth Amendment, which he considered beneficial.
In enforcing these laws, Grant was very careful not to
exceed the popular will.

He did not insist on using the

military to end incidents of rebellion in the South.

Nor did

he place armed guards on the polling booths to protect Union
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sympathizers or freedmen as they attempted to vote.

Not even

in the face of riots did he commit the armed forces for
extended periods of time.

Instead, he used the army only for

brief interventions to resolve a particular emergency or to
stabilize insecure state administrations.

He employed the

threat rather than the act of intervention to maintain
limited order.

In the final analysis, Grant did not wish to

risk the fragile peace by possibly creating a guerrilla war
in the South, and he understood that the people did not want
additional conflict.

By adopting this course, Grant hoped to

maintain "peace" within the United States and to avoid the
partisan warfare so common in the aftermath of a civil war.
This flexible plan, designed to reduce conflict between
Congress and the presidency and within the nation, worked
well during the first four years of Grant's administration.
This was to G r a n t 's credit and in turn was very beneficial to
the nation.

As a result of his actions, the severe conflict

between Congress and Johnson and its threat to the office of
the President was largely ended.
In addition, under Grant's unwritten plan, all of the
remaining states had returned to their former constitutional
relationship with the federal government by 1872.

This was

accomplished without further strife between the two branches
of government.

With the return of the Southern states, the

nation could begin healing the emotional wounds of war.
Secession had torn the nation apart in 1861 and made the
Civil War all but inevitable.

The reunification of the

nation made further armed conflict between the North and
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South highly unlikely.

Had this healing process been

prevented by shutting the former Confederate states out of
the Union, the risk of a renewed conflict would have been
increased and the trials of Reconstruction worsened.

But,

with Grant's assistance, this unhappy circumstance was
avoided and the nation was reunited into a single political
entity.
Grant's procedure of recommending rather than demanding
legislation helped smooth the passage of the important
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

He did not demand

its passage, which might have served to generate increased
Southern resistance out of an incorrect belief that the
situation demanded obstruction rather than grudging
acquiescence.

Nor did he attempt to reshape it or resist it

as Johnson had done, which might have delayed its passage.
Instead, by quietly placing his prestige as the nation's most
famous civil war general and as President behind its
adoption, he helped expedite its passage.

Although it would

be almost a century before the amendment was fully enforced,
Grant helped place it on the books.
In combating insurgent activities of the Klu Klux Klan,
Grant's plan worked well again.

He did not activate the

militia to increase the power of Federal troops and employ
them to control the situation.

Instead, he issued

proclamations of warning, calling for the groups to disperse
and return to their homes.

He recommended that Congress take

the situation under consideration and suggested that it might
pass any legislation deemed appropriate to deal with the
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crisis.

In response, Congress gave him the new "Enforcement

Acts," and armed with this legislation, he dealt with the
Klan.

By 1872, the power of the KKK was broken, and the

insurgents were compelled to abandon that organization as an
effective means of intimidation and terror.
These then were the beneficial results of Grant's
Reconstruction policies.

He clearly had helped reduce

conflict between his office and Congress and between the
North and the South, which had led the nation to war in 1861.
He helped pass the Fifteenth Amendment, which would
eventually be used to guarantee the rights of all citizens to
vote, and helped break the power of the Ku Klux Klan.
But, as time passed, and the nation grew tired of the
political and social issues raised by Reconstruction, Grant's
flexible strategy faltered.

The impact of an economic

depression during his second administration turned the
people's minds away from the "Southern" question and toward
their own personal needs.
The return of the Democrats to Congress in large numbers
from both the South, as the redeemer governments gained a
foothold, and the North after the congressional elections of
1874, reinforced this change of direction.

Grant could no

longer simply turn to Congress for the answer to some new
problem and be assured of receiving new and improved
legislation.

With this altered composition, Congress was

far less willing to comply with G r a n t 's suggestions.
was the major flaw in his flexible approach.

This

As long as

Grant and Congress were of the same mind, Republican
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Reconstruction progressed, but when they differed, the course
grew uncertain.
This uncertainty was particularly apparent when Southern
insurgents continued their violent attacks on the Republicanbacked State governments.

Grant was unable to determine

exactly what he needed to do when the guidance from Congress
faltered.

He intervened cautiously with federal troops on a

piecemeal basis and attempted to walk the tightrope of
maintaining peace while controlling the violence.
end, he failed in this balancing act.

In the

Grant was not

successful, as he had been with the Klan, in dealing with the
activities of these new political insurgents, the southern
Democrats and the white leagues.

Although these groups did

not wear disguises, their violent ways were just as deadly.
To make matters worse, portions of the nation and Congress
actively condemned his actions as tyranny, and others failed
to speak out on his behalf.

His own reluctance to meet

violence with violence, born out of his experiences in the
Civil War, prevented him from calling out the limited troops
available for determined use in quelling the violent
insurrections.
Finally, Grant's own beliefs and plan precluded using
the only remaining alternatives left after his cooperative
relationship with Congress failed.

Other Presidents might

have attempted to seize control and assume overall leadership
by demanding action or utilizing, as had Lincoln, the powers
of the presidency to intervene directly on a significant
scale.

Still others might have turned their backs and given
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in altogether, refusing to deal with the issues at hand and
letting events take their own course.

But Grant had already

rejected these alternatives in his first administration.

He

had adopted a cooperative approach to government, had taken a
stand to support the Reconstruction policies of the
government, and had worked to aid the freedmen.

Moreover,

his own personal commitment not to waver from a chosen course
of action insured that he could not scrap the old plan and
adopt a new one in the final years of his presidency.
It is also highly unlikely that Grant, with his limited
political background, could have seized the initiative.

His

willingness to support and failure to gain acceptance of the
Santo Domingo treaty demonstrated his limited political
capacity.

Grant simply was not the man to commandeer the

legislative process and lead the nation where he wanted it to
go.

In summarizing his presidency, his faithful supporter,

the New York T i m e s , noted that in the end "it was the
misfortune of Gen. Grant that with one step he passed from
the command of the Army to the direction of the affairs of
State" and that "the habits of thought which worked smoothly
in one sphere were unsuited to the o t h e r ."

The newspaper

concluded that Grant as "the leader of a victorious army
found himself at the mercy of pretentious politicians who
abused his confidence and made him the scapegoat for their
sins."i
But, to Grant's credit, he never abandoned the battle,
as did President Hayes, by withdrawing troops from the last
i Ne w York Tribune. March 4, 1877, p. 6.
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two states.

Instead, he continued to seek to enforce the law

of the land and to guarantee the right of both white and
black Americans to vote.

He intervened, however moderately,

to aid the Republican Unionists and the black Americans in
the South.

Also, he successfully avoided the development of

outright partisan warfare in the South, and he maintained at
least a limited peace.
In addition, Grant never quit trying to assist the
freedmen and protect them from their enemies in the South.
Throughout his administration Grant offered his support to
those legislative proposals which called for aid to black
Americans.

He supported the Fifteenth Amendment which

promised African-Americans suffrage.

He advocated patience

and understanding for the freedmen and called on the American
people to extend them an equal opportunity in the areas of
education,

suffrage, and their legal rights.

He signed the

Civil Rights Act of 1875 into law, and he sought to support
Republican state governments that resisted the redeemer's
counterrevolutions in Mississippi and Louisiana.

Even the

New York T r i b u n e . an outspoken critic of Grant's final four
years, acknowledged that "it was certainly a merciful
Providence for the freeman that he found at that critical
time a President" who was so willing to adopt such "a liberal
view of the power and duty of the Executive in extending over
him the protecting shield of the Union."2

Grant truly tried

to help the former slaves, but all of his support and actions
did not insure their social, civil, and political rights
2

New York Tribune. March 3, 1877, p. 6.
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including suffrage in the face of the redeemers' resistance.
That he did not succeed in many of his endeavors should not
erase the evidence that he did try to and did delay the final
collapse of Reconstruction.
In summary, the final results of Grant's Reconstruction
policies were mixed.

He did help reunite the nation, pass

the Fifteenth Amendment and break the power of the Klan in
1872.

He also refused to abandon the Republican-based state

governments or the freedmen in the former rebel states.

He

did not, however, make the Reconstruction process in the
South work, and he was unable to stop either the violence or
the resurgence of the redeemer-controlled governments.

Nor

did he enable black Americans to retain their full rights as
American citizens under the law.

Both the successes and

failures resulted to an extent from the unwritten plan by
which he acted as President.

While it may well be said that

the years between 1867 and 1877 were ones of "Congressional"
Reconstruction, it must also be said that President Grant had
a definite hand in what occurred.

And considering his

limited social and political background and the overwhelming
complexity of the issues addressed in Reconstruction, Grant
did take a position and held it until the opposition became
overwhelming and his allies abandoned the field before him.
For in the end, it was Grant who assured that Congressional
legislation was enforced to the best of his ability long
after others had lost interest in the process.
Reconstruction's successes and failures must be ascribed to
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Grant and Congress, the partners who failed to meet all of
their obligations to all of the people.
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